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ASSISTED CONCEPTION AND EQUALITY
OF FAMILIAL STATUS IN PARENTAGE
LAW
Wanda Wiegers
Abstract: This article provides an in-depth analysis of
outcomes in parentage disputes involving assisted conception
across Canada. Throughout this article, I draw on equality of
status, familial security and equity in terms of gender and
sexual orientation as norms or values that should underlie and
guide the legal regulation of parenthood in the context of
reproductive technologies. Throughout, I also compare and
contrast the sources of and the implications for children and
parents of resistance in law towards the abolition of
illegitimacy and the regulation of assisted conception.
INTRODUCTION
Parenthood has always been a complex and culturally variable
legal construct. At common law, the husband of a mother of a
child was presumed to be the father of that child. Rebuttable
only by stringent proof that the husband could not possibly
have fathered the child, this presumption in effect made
marriage the most important marker of parental-child status at
law. Outside of marriage, children born to unwed mothers had
no legal relations and could not inherit status or property
through their fathers. The implications of illegitimacy changed
over time, first in relation to biological mothers and then
fathers. The eradication of related disabilities marked a
revolutionary step forward in parentage law but occurred in
many parts of Canada only after a number of successful
challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1. In 1990, the Minister of Justice in Saskatchewan
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Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
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described the abolition of illegitimacy as a reform that was
“long overdue.”2
Over the last few decades, technological change has
presented new and different challenges in parentage law. While
paternity testing has made genetic or biological parentage more
easily ascertainable and less dependent on marital or other
presumptions, the advent of reproductive technologies has
fragmented parenthood into separate social and biological
components. 3 Some legislatures have again, however, been
slow to grapple with the legal status of parties who use assisted
conception. Only a few provinces, namely Alberta, Quebec,
and most recently British Columbia, have a comprehensive
legal framework in place to establish parentage and identify the
relative rights and responsibilities of all the involved parties. In
others, legislative action has been piecemeal or minimal. To the
extent that reform has taken place in provinces such as
Saskatchewan, it has been limited largely to the registration of
births. This legislative lacuna exists despite the fact that a
Uniform Child Status Act was formulated in 2010 and proposed
for implementation across Canada.4

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2

Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates,
Committee of the Whole (12 June 1990), online: Legislative
Assembly of Saskatchewan <http://docs.legassembly.sk.ca/legdocs/
Legislative%20Assembly/Hansard/21L4S/900612e.PDF> See also
The Children’s Law Act, 1997, SS 1997, c C-8.2, s 40(3) [CLA,
1997].

3

See Susan B Boyd, “Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties,
Intentionality and Responsibility” (2007) 25 Windsor YB Access Just
63 [Boyd,“Gendering”]; Richard Collier & Sally Sheldon,
Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (Portland: Hart,
2008).

4

Civil Law Section of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, A
Joint Project of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Coordinating Committee of Senior
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There is obviously a lot at stake in establishing the
parentage of children. Recognition of the status of a parent
provides an opportunity for adults to experience and enjoy a
long-lasting relationship with a child. These emotional
connections to children are seen as ever more important to
adults in a world marked increasingly by conjugal and
economic insecurity. The financial implications of parental
status are also significant, as parents can be liable for child
support in excess of 18 years. For children, of course, their
identity is largely shaped by their parentage, which determines
their names, relationships, nationality, financial status, and
lineage.5 Parentage, for both parents and children, establishes
affective ties, economic and emotional well-being, and to a
great extent, one’s life path and development. Many of the
most meaningful rights, benefits and obligations flow through
parentage. Uncertainty or conflict as to parental status at the
outset of a child’s life has the potential to critically undermine
these benefits by increasing stress and instability throughout
the lives of both caregivers and children.
Given the importance of familial security and equality
of status to parents and children and its recognition in the
context of illegitimacy, why do legislative gaps persist in the
area of assisted conception in some jurisdictions? The novelty
of reproductive technologies and uncertainty or ambivalence
about the potential limits of technological intervention in the
creation of human life may have initially stalled reform but can
less adequately explain current inaction. As Marsha Garrison
notes in the United States, many of these technologies are no
longer novel and the legal issues emerging from their use are
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Officials on Family Justice, “Uniform Child Status Act”, Halifax,
Nova Scotia, August 22-26, 2010.
5

British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, Justice Services
Branch, Civil Policy and Legislation Office, White Paper on Family
Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act,
(Victoria: Ministry of Justice, 2010) at 29.
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fairly clear.6 As of 2012, there were at least 33 fertility clinics
operating in Canada, assisting in thousands of pregnancies and
births.7 Since 2002, usage rates appear to have increased as
clinics have reported a greater number of cycles performed and
higher pregnancy and birth rates.8 Garrison suggests that tens
of thousands in the US have used or are using reproductive
technologies9 and notes that most other developed nations have
moved towards comprehensive reform.10
Is the failure to provide certainty and stability within
families that rely on assisted conception the mark of a new or
continuing illegitimacy?11 Can it be said that these parents and
children still face stigma and exclusion under the law, much
like unmarried parents and their children did in many parts of
Canada up to the 1990s? What can be learned from the
successful struggle against illegitimacy that may assist in the
struggle for reforms in the area of assisted conception?
Notably, the status of illegitimacy was challenged at a time
when increasing numbers of children were being born outside
of marriage, many of them born to parents in common law
6

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Marsha Garrison, “Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage” (2000) 113
Harvard Law Review 837 at 852. I use “assisted conception” in this
article to denote gestational motherhood or surrogacy and the use of
sperm and ova from single donors.

7

Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register (CARTR),
“2012 CARTR Results,” online: Canadian Fertility and Andrology
Society <http://www.cfas.ca> at slide 2.

8

Joanne Gunby et al, “Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in
Canada: 2007 results from the Canadian ART Register” (2011) 95:2
Fertility and Sterility 542 at 546.

9

Garrison, supra note 6 at 852, n 80.

10

Ibid at 852-53.

11

See text accompanying notes 44-46 below.
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unions that were functionally similar to marital relationships.
For many, the abolition of illegitimacy served to enhance the
status of biological fathers by making it easier for mothers to
seek support from them and easier for fathers to have
continuing relationships with their biologically-related
children. 12 By contrast, those seeking to use reproductive
technologies include not only married and unmarried
heterosexual couples who are experiencing infertility but also
same sex couples and single men and women who want to
parent alone. Relative to the struggles against illegitimacy, the
potential diversity of family structures in the context of assisted
reproduction poses a much greater challenge to dominant
familial norms13 and to the intensification of privatized support
since the 1990s.14 Arguably, it is precisely these value and
policy choices that underlie and generate much of the stigma
and negative stereotyping of families formed through assisted
conception, particularly single mother families.
In Part II of this article, I begin by identifying
alternative values that from a relational perspective should
propel legal reform in the area of assisted conception. As

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

12

Susan B Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood? A Socio-Legal Study
of Choice and Constraint (forthcoming, 2014 Univ. of Toronto Press)
ch 3 [Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?].

13

See Alison Bird, “Legal Parenthood and the Recognition of
Alternative Family Forms in Canada” (2009) 60 UNBLJ 264; Fiona
Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in
Maintaining the Traditional Family,” (2009) 21 CJWL 315 [Kelly,
“Producing Paternity”]; Fiona Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children:
Reforming Canada’s Parentage Laws to Recognize the Completeness
of Women-led Families” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 253 [Kelly, “Equal
Parents”].

14

Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, “Introduction: Privatization, Law,
and the Challenge to Feminism” in Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman,
eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002); Susan Boyd, Child Custody, Law
and Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford, 2003).
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recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in AA v BB,15 the
deep value underlying the move towards abolition of
illegitimacy was equality of familial status between children. I
argue that this value, along with that of equality in terms of
gender and sexual orientation, should be applied to families
that are formed by way of assisted conception in order to
provide all members with familial security and to avoid
stereotyping and punishing parents and their children for
deviation from dominant familial norms. In Part III, I provide a
detailed summary of legal outcomes in the area of assisted
conception and identify the specific gaps that exist in some
jurisdictions. I illustrate how these gaps lead to irrational and
untenable outcomes, particularly in Saskatchewan, and
highlight how outcomes differ across jurisdictions. Although
some parents may be able to rely on step-parent adoptions or
standing as a step-parent to maintain a relationship with a child,
the outcomes overall reflect a failure to promote the values of
equality of status, familial security and non-discrimination on
the grounds of gender and sexual orientation. In Part IV, I
argue that reliance on the parens patriae jurisdiction of
superior courts, as has occurred in Ontario, cannot adequately
fill the legislative gap because it relies exclusively on a childcentred norm and fails to promote in a consistent way the
above-mentioned values. Although Charter challenges
appeared to be significant in the elimination of discrimination
against single mothers, fathers and children by reason of
illegitimacy, I finally canvas the material differences and the
potential pitfalls in relying on section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to generate change in the area
of assisted conception.16

15

16
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AA v BB, [2007] ONCA 2, leave to appeal refused Alliance for
Marriage and Family v A(A), 2007 SCC 40, [2007] 3 SCR 124.
Charter, supra note 1.
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GUIDING VALUES OR NORMS
Because parenthood connotes a relationship, a relational
perspective will more adequately address the complex realities
and the vital significance of the parent-child relationship to the
lives of both parents and children.17 Unlike an individualistic
perspective, a relational lens can more fully take account of the
intense interdependence between parents and children and the
multiple ways in which the well-being of one profoundly
affects the other. As such, the values that guide parentage law
in structuring the parent-child relationship should
predominantly be those that can account for the interests of
both parents and children without exclusively focusing on one
or the other. Although parentage at one point in time conferred
almost absolute authority over children, it is now readily
acknowledged that children are not the property of parents but
rather that parents owe duties and obligations towards them.
Conversely, parentage in law has never been governed solely
by the best interests of children but rather has largely been
determined on the basis of biological maternity, marriage to the
mother, and actual or presumed paternity. Thus, the law of
parentage itself has reflected to some degree a convergence of
the interests of both parents and children.
In this section, I argue that three values or social norms
should have a significant role in shaping the contours of
parentage law in the context of assisted conception. I draw on a
fundamental value underlying the abolition of illegitimacy, that
of equality of status, in addition to a concern for familial
17

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See e.g. Susan B. Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory
and Parenting Apart” (2010) 18(2) Fem Legal Stud 127; Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy
and Law (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012); Helen Rhoades,
“Revising Australia’s Parenting Laws: A Plea for a Relational
Approach to Children’s Best Interests” (2010) 22 Child and Family
Law Quarterly 172.
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security and equality in terms of gender and sexual orientation.
These values are not exhaustive of all relevant values, nor
necessarily determinative of all outcomes.18 As well, there are
interpretative contests as to what these values mean and will
entail in their application to concrete fact situations. There is,
in my view, no “bright-line test” that will generate easy
resolutions given the diverse range of circumstances and
technologies available.19 Arguably, however, the interpretations
I defend have the potential to point toward determinate
outcomes that are already reflected in legislation such as the
recent Family Law Act in British Columbia20 and to a large
extent, the proposed Uniform Child Status Act21.
Since the abolition of illegitimacy, most parentage
provisions now begin with a declaration that a person is the
child of his or her parents and his or her status as their child is
independent of whether he or she is born within or outside
marriage.22 In AA v BB, the Ontario Court of Appeal identified
equality of child status as the fundamental norm or objective
underlying the abolition of illegitimacy.23 Rosenberg JA stated:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

18

See e.g. Lori Chambers, “Newborn Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic
Fathers and Reproductive Autonomy” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 339
(other values could be identified, such as reproductive autonomy);
Katharine T Bartlett, “Re-Expressing Parenthood” (1988) 98 Yale LJ
293 (emphasis on responsible parenthood). I choose not to rely on
notions of responsibility since they are heavily inflected with the
individualism so dominant in neo-liberalism, see e.g. Linda C
McClain, “‘Irresponsible’ Reproduction” (1996) 47 Hastings LJ 339.

19

But see Garrison, supra note 6 (who argues in favor of such a test at
868).

20

Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [BC FLA].

21

Supra note 4.

22

See e.g. CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 40; Children’s Law Reform Act,
RSO 1990, c C.12, s 1(1) [Ontario CLRA].

23

Supra note 15 at paras 20, 35.
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The purpose of the legislation was to declare
that all children should have equal status. At the
time, equality of status meant recognizing the
equality of children born inside and outside of
marriage. The Legislature had in mind
traditional unions between one mother and one
father. It did not legislate in relation to other
types
of
relationships
because
those
relationships and the advent of reproductive
technology were beyond the vision of the Law
Reform Commission and the Legislature of the
day.24
The Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that the same
underlying principle, i.e. that all children should have “equal
status in law” regardless of their families of origin or the
conditions of their birth, should apply in the context of assisted
conception. “There is nothing in the legislative history of the
CLRA to suggest that the Legislature made a deliberate policy
choice to exclude the children of lesbian mothers from the
advantages of equality of status accorded to other children
under the Act.”25 Lack of recognition meant that “children of
these relationships are deprived of the equality of status that
declarations of parentage provide.”26 In the result, relying on
the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, both the biological
mother and the social mother were declared mothers in addition
to the biological father. The recognition of three parents,
including two mothers, was presented as a function of
children’s equal status.
The meaning and parameters of ‘equal status’ in this
context are contestable but the vision of equality relied on by
24
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Ibid at para 34.

25

Ibid at para 38.

26

Ibid at para 35.
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the Court in AA v BB is not that of formal equality and its
implications extend beyond the status of the child. Obviously,
there are differences in the birth circumstances of children born
to biological parents outside of marriage and children
conceived through the use of assisted reproduction. In the
particular case of AA v BB, there were two mothers, one of
whom was a social mother, as well as a biological father.
Notwithstanding these differences, the Court postulates that the
families of the children in both situations should be supported
and recognized as legally valid. In both, the family forms at
issue were identified as departures from traditional norms.
Interpreted contextually, against the backdrop of historically
dominant social norms, equality of familial status challenges
not only the marital form of family but also the biological,
heterosexual dyad as the preferred site for the rearing of
children. Non-biological heterosexual families contradict the
assumed ‘naturalness’ of this ideal dyad, as evident in efforts
throughout most of the twentieth century to seal adoption
records, falsely amend birth certificates and mimic in other
ways the biological family.27 However, same sex and single
parent families currently pose the greatest challenges to
dominant familial norms and both have been the object of
historical and continuing discrimination.
Historically, in the context of illegitimacy, both legal
and religious norms contributed to the suffering and
stigmatization of the ‘fallen woman’ and her child. However,
unmarried women and children who depended on public
provision through the parish relief system in England from the
late sixteenth century onward suffered most, by way of
confinement in the workhouse, the exploitation of child labour
in apprenticeships and factories, and the whipping or
27

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See Naomi R Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, eds, Families by Law:
An Adoption Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2004);
Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of
Parenting (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993) at 164-86.
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imprisonment of mothers themselves up to 1816.28 The New
Poor law of 1834 maintained this punitive orientation towards
mothers: they were separated from their children upon birth,
made primarily liable for support of their children but not
allowed to directly obtain support from fathers (payments were
made to the parish) and, like rape victims at common law, their
testimony against putative fathers required corroboration
before it could be believed.29 In Canada, unmarried mothers
who could claim public relief were not generally subject to the
same range and severity of punishments but their claims for
support in the twentieth century were subject to some of the
same limitations, including the need for corroboration, and in
many jurisdictions, payment could only be made to the state
and not the mother directly. Until the abolition of illegitimacy
in the late twentieth century, Susan B. Boyd and Lori
Chambers document the same tendency for state agencies and
lawmakers to view unmarried mothers as untrustworthy and
degenerate, especially those who had never cohabited with
fathers.30 The animus behind these policies was not only a
concern with protecting men from mendacious women but also
a desire to discourage and inhibit single women from bearing
children and relying on state support.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

28

Jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy: An Examination of Bastardy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1982) at 62-3 (in 1760, 80% of the infants
born in or placed in the workhouse died before the age of 12 months).

29

Ibid at 65.

30

In Ontario, only 6.7% of mothers who had never cohabited with the
alleged fathers were successful in obtaining agreements or child
support orders between 1921 and 1969, compared to 87.9% of
mothers who had cohabited with fathers. Lori Chambers,
Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the Ontario Children of
Unmarried Parents Act, 1921-1969 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2007) at 150; Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?, supra
note 12.
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It is significant that most of the shame and ignominy of
illegitimacy was heaped upon mothers and their children. 31
Although biological fathers lacked legal status and were
commonly assumed to lack interest in their progeny, mothers
were considered primarily responsible for pre- or extra-marital
sexual conduct and its consequences. 32 The “prototypical
illegitimate social identity” was the “mother of the illegitimate
child.”33 Well into the twentieth century, unmarried mothers
were considered sexually immoral or psychologically troubled,
and their children were considered at risk and better off if
placed for adoption outside of their mothers’ care. 34
31

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
See e.g. Peter Ward, “Unwed motherhood in nineteenth-century
English Canada” (1981) 16 Historical Papers 34; Constance B.
Backhouse, “Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts:
Infanticide in Nineteenth Century Canada” (1984) 34 Univ of Toronto
Law Jnl 447 at 448; Andree Levesque, “Deviants Anonymous:
Single Mothers at the Hopital de la Misericorde in Montreal, 19291939” in Katherine Arnup, Andree Levesque & Ruth Roach Pierson,
eds, Delivering Motherhood: Maternal Ideologies and Practices in
the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Routledge, 1990) 108;
Margaret Jane Hillyard Little, ‘No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit’
The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario 1920 – 1997
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 12, 135-36 (mothers of
illegitimate children were denied Mother’s allowance or subjected to
more onerous conditions of eligibility up to 1966 in Ontario).

32

Lorenne MG Clark & Debra J Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive
Sexuality (Toronto: The Women’s Press, 1977) at 155-56 (a double
standard of sexual morality also played out in rape law); Rickie
Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race Before
Roe v. Wade (New York: Routledge, 1992) (according to Rickie
Solinger, in post-war United States, “[t]he girl or woman who ‘got
herself pregnant’ was the locus of blame, the target of treatment
programs and punishments” at 36).

33

Gail Reekie, Measuring Immorality: Social Inquiry & the Problem of
Illegitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 181.

34

Veronica Strong-Boag, Finding Families, Finding Ourselves: English
Canada Encounters Adoption from the Nineteenth Century to the
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Illegitimacy, as such, had consequences beyond the legal
exclusion of fathers. From the perspective of the unmarried
mother and child, illegitimacy was a disciplinary practice
aimed at preserving the primacy of legal marriage and limiting
the reliance of single mothers upon state support.35
Reforms of the last two to three decades have
substantially changed the legal impact of parentage outside of
marriage for mothers and their children, and for fathers.
Statutes limiting rights to support through requirements such as
corroboration were finally struck down as contrary to the
Charter in the late 1980s.36 Ontario was the first jurisdiction to
abolish the status of illegitimacy in 1977, with most others
following suit up to 1990.37 Nova Scotia has abolished most of
the disabilities associated with illegitimacy but still allows for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1990s (Toronto: OUP, 2006); Regina G. Kunzel, Fallen Women,
Problem Girls: Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalization of
Social Work (New Haven, 1993: Yale University Press) at 144-170;
Solinger, supra note 32 (found that the US government and private
agencies generally perceived white unwed mothers as mentally ill and
black unwed mothers as sexually immoral).
35

Chambers, supra note 30 at 14-32; Derek Gill, Illegitimacy, Sexuality
and the Status of Women (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) 308; Little,
supra note 31 at 128.

36

See infra, note 248.

37

See e.g. Children’s Law Reform Act, SO 1977, c 41, ss 1-2; Law and
Equity Act, RSBC 1979, c 224, s 56; Charter of Rights Amendments
Act 1985 SBC 1985, c. 68; The Children’s Law Act, SS 1990-91, c C8.1, ss 40-42; An Act to Amend the Family Maintenance Act, SM
1982-83-84, c 54, s 24; Child and Family Services and Family
Relations Act SNB 1980, c C-2.1, s 96(1); The Children’s Law Act
SN 1988, c 61, s 89(1), Child Status Act SPEI 1987, c 8, s 1(1).
Alberta, however, did not repeal its separate Parentage and
Maintenance Act until 2003 (Family Law Act SA 2003, c F-4.5) and
only repealed its Legitimation Act in 2011 (Family Law Statutes
Amendment Act, 2010 SA 2010, c 16, s 1).

160

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 28]!

the legitimation of children through marriage subsequent to
birth.38 These changes overall reflected a growing consensus
that it was morally indefensible to hold children responsible for
parental ‘misdeeds’ and on that basis relegate them to an
inferior status in relation to other children.39 Abolition helped
reduce the stigma of illegitimacy for children and their mothers
while simultaneously responding to claims that unwed fathers
should have equal parental rights. These developments were
consistent with improved paternity testing, a declining birth
rate, a growing acceptance of common law relationships, and
an increasing emphasis on fatherhood in family law. As
importantly, these developments aligned with a neoliberal trend
favouring the privatization of dependency over the 1980s and
90s through an expansion of individual support obligations.40
While reforms related to illegitimacy ultimately
brought biological dads in and increased the range and amount
of child support, assisted conception, by contrast, has the
potential to leave some biological dads out, depending on the
38
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Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, ss 49-50.

39

Boyd et al, Autonomous Motherhood?, supra note 12.

40

Fudge & Cossman, supra note 14. Neo-liberalism describes a
restructuring process or policy orientation underway since at least the
mid-1970s that has promoted greater reliance on private (rather than
public) sources of economic support such as market income, family
supports and the voluntary sector, see Wanda Wiegers, “ChildCentred Advocacy and the Invisibility of Women in Poverty
Discourse and Social Policy” in Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B. Boyd &
Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law and
Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 229 at 235-46. The
expansion of private support obligations has included extended
support for adult children and an enlarged role for step-parents
through provincial legislation along with passage of the federal Child
Support Guidelines (CSG) and more rigorous enforcement measures.
Under the CSG, biological fathers are primarily liable for child
support.
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configuration of the family. In AA v BB, the Court increased the
number of parents to three by recognizing the social mother but
the applicants pursued this option because they wanted to
maintain the parental status of the biological father. 41 This
outcome was, strictly speaking, a departure from a dominant
two-parent heterosexual familial model but one which may
have been viewed as palatable to the Court because it retained
parental ties to the biological parents and expanded the sources
of emotional and financial support for the child while not
exposing him to instability or parental conflict. The Court did
not have to contend with a motion by two lesbian mothers or a
single mother to relinquish the parental status of a sperm donor.
Both same sex and single parenthood mark a radical
departure from heterosexual reproduction and the “idea that
there are natural sexual differences in parenting behavior.”42
Single parenthood also reduces the private sources of financial
support for a child to less than two.43 Here again, however, a
refusal to recognize the validity of such families perpetuates
stigma for children and their caregivers as a result of family
structure, the number of parents or the circumstances of birth.
It assumes that these families invariably provide inadequate
settings for the rearing of children. Exclusion by law can
thereby continue to play a substantial role in stigmatizing a
father’s absence, not by virtue of a refusal to recognize some
fathers, but rather, by a refusal to equally recognize children
and families without fathers. This failure to fully recognize
fatherless families is functionally similar to the disabilities and
stigma formerly targeted at unwed mothers and children under
the old illegitimacy laws. 44 As Gail Reekie suggests,

41
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Supra note 15.

42

Reekie, supra note 33 at 182.

43

Kelly, “Producing Paternity,” supra note 13 at 329.

44

The comparison I am making here with illegitimacy should be
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illegitimacy functions culturally “as a metaphor for socially
undesirable reproduction” 45 and “covertly as support for its
binary opposite – legitimacy”, a principle which has defined
normative parenthood as having a father.46
Marsha Garrison, however, has argued that equal status
for children means that similar rules should govern cases
involving both sexual and assisted conception.47 She uses an
“interpretative approach” to identify two dominant themes in
American parentage law in the context of sexual conception
and adoption: “children’s interests come first and two-parent
care is generally preferable to that of one parent alone.”48 In
other words, Garrison starts from a potentially discriminatory
premise to generate outcomes that are consistent with a twoparent, preferably marital outcome. Her analysis depends
vitally on the assumption that two parents are a socially
preferred family form and one that the law can legitimately
encourage
and
support
irrespective
of
individual
49
circumstances. Equally important is the assumption that
differences between sexual and technological conception are or
should be wholly irrelevant to parentage law. She argues that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
distinguished from that of US authors who define the “new
illegitimacy” as a refusal to recognize more than one parent,
presumably to the child’s detriment, see e.g. Susan Frelich Appleton,
“Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New” (2012) 20 Am U J Gender Soc
Pol’y & L 347 at 371. This usage relies predominantly on the
father’s experience of illegitimacy as the reference point or norm for
comparison.
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Reekie, supra note 33 at 178.
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Ibid at 895.
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See below, Part V for discussion of the impact of section 15 of the
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the circumstances surrounding a child’s birth or the “mechanics
of conception” are not relevant to the “relational interests that
ultimately result.” 50 As such, the legal standards governing
heterosexual intercourse and assisted conception should be the
same and children born through either process should have
identical rights.
A number of consequences follow from Garrison’s
focus on the interests of children in isolation from those of
parents, her reliance on a formal conception of equality, and
her use of heterosexual procreation as the norm for the
evaluation of alternative family forms. Since biological fathers
are invariably held responsible for child support (regardless of
representations regarding birth control, etc.)51 and can claim
custody and access as a result of sexual conception, she argues
that the same rights should be available to children born
through assisted conception. More specifically, since children
conceived in the ordinary course of conception have two
parents, a mother and father, so should children conceived
through assisted conception regardless of the arrangements
made between the relevant parties. In Garrison’s perspective,
lesbian and single-mother households are both problematic
because they deny a child a paternal relationship and in the
latter case, a second legal parent.52 Susan Frelich Appleton in
fact identifies a new “subset of ‘illegitimate’ children” as those
children born of assisted conception who have no legally
recognized father. 53 Both scholars appear to assume that
children are inevitably disadvantaged by this treatment.

50
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Garrison, supra note 6 at 882.
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See e.g. Buschow v Jors [1994] SJ No 136, 118 Sask R 306 (QB).
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Garrison, supra note 6 at 903.

53

Supra note 44 at 371, 384.
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However, contrary to the assumption that a child needs
an ongoing relationship with a father or father figure in order to
thrive, empirical evidence suggests that children in female-led
two parent families fare as well, if not better, than children in
heterosexual two-parent households.54 Studies also suggest that
the absence of a genetic relationship with a caregiver does not
in itself inhibit healthy child development.55 Empirical studies
do indicate that children in single parent households differ on
average in terms of educational achievement, emotional health,
and future occupational status.56 However, these correlations
may be largely, if not entirely, explained by lower levels of
financial support, conflict that pre-dated separation or
continues during or after separation, and inadequate social
supports.57 Because most studies conflate divorced, separated,
54
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Timothy J Biblarz & Judith Stacey, “How does the Gender of Parents
Matter?” (2010) 72 Journal of Marriage and Family 3 at 13.

55

See e.g. Susan Golombok et al, “Social vs. Biological Parenting:
Family Functioning and the Socio-Emotional Development of
Children Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation” (1999) 40 Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry 519 at 525; Ava D Agar, Jan DD
Cioe & Boris B Gorzalka, “Biology Matters? Intimate Relationships
of Young Adults from Divorced and Intact Family Background as a
Function of Biological Father and Male Model Involvement” (2010)
51 International Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 441.

56

See e.g. Anne-Marie Ambert, One Parent Families: Characteristics,
Causes, Consequences and Issues (Ottawa: Vanier Institute, 2006) at
15-16; Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, “Father Absence
and Child Well-Being: A Critical Review” in Daniel P Moynihan,
Timothy M Smeeding, & Lee Rainwater eds, The Future of the
Family (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004) 116 (in a review
of numerous American studies find that children in one-parent
families experience lower rates of academic achievement, a higher
incidence of behavioral problems, earlier home leaving and childbearing, poorer physical and psychological health and lower adult
income and occupational status on average than children in twoparent homes, at 120-126).
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Ambert, ibid at 16. Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, ibid, indicate that
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or cohabiting households with never-married or nevercohabiting ones, some of these underlying factors would also
arguably not come into play to the same extent in relation to
single parents relying on assisted conception. The latter are not
undergoing transitions or dissolution and their pregnancies are
not unexpected; as such, they are likely to be relatively more
stable than many of the households used to generate the
average differentials.58
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income loss and economic insecurity upon separation explains at least
half, possibly more, of the differential. When underlying differences
in well-being prior to, during or after separation (e.g. by reason of
inter-parental conflict) are taken into account, differences then
become “smaller, sometimes statistically insignificant,” at 127-28.
Evidence is mixed as to the impact of reduced ability to supervise and
monitor children and outcomes may depend on the kind of
relationship – whether close and authoritative – developed with a
second parent. The emotional or psychological impact of family
dissolution upon a custodial parent’s ability to provide “emotional
support and moderate, consistent control” is consistently supported as
a variable generating adverse effects, at 136. See Don Kerr & Roderic
Beaujot, “Family Relations, Low Income and Child Outcomes: A
Comparison of Canadian Children in Intact, Step and Lone Parent
Families” (2004) 43 International Journal of Comparative Sociology
134 (identifying factors such as family functioning, number of
children, education and age of parents as relevant to child outcomes
in addition to low income); Lee Caragata & Sara J Cumming, “Lone
Mother-led Families: Exemplifying the Structure of Social
Inequality” (2011) 5:5 Sociology Compass 376 (suggesting income,
housing tenure and maternal education may fully explain the
association between lone motherhood and negative child outcomes).
58

See e.g. Jennifer Lansford, Antonia Abbey, & Abigail Stewart, “Does
Family Structure Matter? A Comparison of Adoptive, Two-Parent
Biological, Single-Mother, Stepfather, and Stepmother Households”
(2001) 63:3 Journal of Marriage and Family 840 (suggest that family
processes are more important than family structure) and Susan
Golombok and Shirlene Badger, “Children raised in mother-headed
families from infancy: a follow-up of children of lesbian and single
heterosexual mothers, at early adulthood” (2010) 25:1 Human
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In any case, notwithstanding differences in risk
between two-parent and single parent households on average,
“the clear majority [of children in all lone-parent households]
grow up healthy” and their outcomes are no different than
those of children in two-parent households.59 Many also have
adequate financial incomes and extended familial support and
many would no doubt fare better if more socialized supports
were available.60 Moreover, as indicated by divorce statistics,
there is no guarantee that two heterosexual parents at the outset
of a child’s life will comprise or remain a stable, harmonious
family unit.61 Indeed, children in intact but highly conflicted

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Reproduction 150 (children functioning well, with lower levels of
anxiety and higher levels of self-esteem than the comparison group of
children in traditional two-parent families: “This finding is in direct
contrast to the more negative psychological outcomes associated with
single-mother families following separation or divorce, and highlights
the diversity among female-headed families and the importance of not
treating them as the same” at 56); Elizabeth Nixon, Sheila Greene and
Diane Hogan, “”It’s What’s Normal for Me”: Children’s Experiences
of Growing Up in a Continuously Single-Parent Household” (2013)
XX(X) Journal of Family Issues 1 at 8.
59

David P. Ross, Paul A. Roberts & Katherine Scott, “How Do LoneParent Children Differ from All Children” (Ottawa: Applied Research
Branch, 1998).

60

See Lee Rainwater & Timothy M Smeeding, “Single-Parent Poverty,
Inequality, and the Welfare State” in Moynihan, Smeeding, &
Rainwater, supra note 56 [Rainwater & Smeeding] (a cross-national
comparison of income support policies that improve the economic
well-being of children in single parent families); Nancy E. Dowd In
the Defence of Single-Parent Families (New York: New York
University Press, 1999) (argues that single parent families are blamed
for structural failures in US family law, the workplace and social
policy).
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According to the 2011 General Social Survey (a voluntary
population-based survey) 38% of divorced or separated parents, or
1.2 million Canadians, had a child together when they separated or
divorced. Marire Sinha, Parenting and Child Support After

Assisted Conception and Equality

167

two-parent homes often fare worse than children in divorced
families.62 The well-being of children thus depends on many
interrelated factors that vary according to the individual
circumstances of each household.
Ironically, while seeking to achieve equal status for
children, Garrison chooses a norm that would not only deprive
the child in AA v BB of more than two parents but would highly
stigmatize children in lesbian and single parent families. The
number of children raised in single parent households in
particular is not insubstantial. According to the 2011 Census of
Population in Canada, the number of lone-parent families
increased 8 percent between 2006 and 2011 and represented
16.3 percent (1,527,840) of all families, with 19.3 percent of all
children living with lone parents and 8 out of 10 of these
families being headed by women.63 These families include not
only separated or divorced households in which contact is
maintained with each parent but also families in which a single
parent has adopted or where fathers are unknown, a parent has
died or abandoned his or her children, or where access is
contrary to the children’s best interests. 64 With one in five
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Separation or Divorce (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2014) at 5.
62

Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 56 at 127, 140; Donna
Ruane Morrison & Mary Jo Coro, “Parental Conflict and Marital
Disruption: Do Children Benefit when High Conflict Marriages are
Dissolved?” (1999) 61(3) Journal of Marriage and Family 626;
Martha Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s
Adjustment to Divorce: What the Social Science Literature Does and
Does Not Tell Us” (2007) 26 Can Fam LQ 285 at 289-90.
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Statistics Canada, 2011 Census of Population, online:
<http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-312x/98-312-x2011001-eng.cfm> [accessed July 3, 2013].
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Cathryne L Schmitz, “Reframing the Dialogue on Female-Headed
Single-Parent Families” (1995) 10 Affilia 426 at 437-38. Schmitz
argues that “single-parent families are not the homogeneous group
they are commonly portrayed to be” and that “the diversity of family
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children being raised in a lone parent household, these families
should not be stereotyped and socially stigmatized as inferior.
Parents and children in these families should not be presumed
to be defective simply due to the composition of their
household.
The concern that single parents have fewer sources of
financial support is, unfortunately, reflective of a political
climate in which governments are choosing to diminish public
resources for families and parents are forced to be increasingly
reliant on private sources. Policies that promoted greater social
responsibility for children, such as those adopted in northern
European nations, would help to allay these concerns.65 Even in
the absence of such policies, however, there is evidence that
parents who use assisted conception typically engage in a high
level of planning and advance deliberation and many have
made careful financial provision for their families in advance
of conception.66 Where households do face a higher risk of
reliance on social assistance, lessons from the illegitimacy
context suggest that single mothers and their children as a
group should not be punished for not having engaged fathers or
for reliance on social provision.
Equality of familial status is linked to the value of
familial security, which is important to parents and children

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
styles by race, ethnicity, economic condition,
circumstances is frequently unknown or ignored.”
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See Rainwater & Smeeding, supra note 60 at 97-98. The percentage
of children who lived in single-mother families in the 1990s in the US
and UK was higher than the percentage in Sweden, Denmark, Finland
and Norway. However, the latter countries had substantially lower
single-mother child poverty rates both as a result of higher wages and
higher levels of social support.
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Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government
Services Canada, 1993) at 471-72.
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and society more generally. Familial security can be promoted
by a vast range of initiatives, including the provision of
socialized supports. Knowledge of one’s parental identity and
genealogical history at a certain age through the use of known
or identity-release donors may also enhance a child’s sense of
familial security.67 At its most basic level, however, familial
security requires consistency and predictability in the
regulation of parental rights and responsibilities. Uncertainty as
to parental roles is a threat to the stability of these families,
particularly in the case of mothers who lack a biological tie to a
child as well as access to presumptions of parentage but also in
the case of single parents who have planned to parent alone.
Several writers have documented, for example, the fears held
by lesbian mothers of excessive interference with their
parenting and the sense that their families are vulnerable to
attack and intrusion that will be destabilizing to their and their
child’s understanding of family. According to Fiona Kelly’s
findings, if the law protected lesbian mothers from these
effects, or “gave them more security, lesbian mothers might be
more open to [some level of] donor involvement,” which may
well benefit children.68
My argument here should not be confused with a claim
that relies simply on contractual rights as the basis for the
resolution of issues surrounding assisted conception. Garrison
contends that scholars who rely on intentionality and the
reliance interests of the intended parents must demonstrate
“why intention and reliance should count for so much more
67

68
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See Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “DeAnonymizing Sperm Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and
Directions” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 95 at 109-110.
“(Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal Parentage
Within Planned Lesbian Families” (2009) 40 Ottawa L Rev 185 at
208. See Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal
Recognition of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver, UBC
Press, 2011).
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here than they do elsewhere in the law of parentage, or how an
approach focused on adult intentions can be reconciled with
children’s interests.”69 It is well established that agreements
generally are not binding on courts insofar as they relate to
children. As seen in the adoption context, parentage is not
simply the product of the adoptive and biological parents’
intentions. Although biological parentage can be relinquished
by consent or agreement, the extensive degree of regulation
and monitoring (the need for consent of biological parents after
birth, the prohibition of consideration and advertisements, and
the need for a home study and formal court order) reflect a
refusal to treat a child simply as an object of exchange.
Similarly, the intentions underlying the use of assisted
conception should not be given effect simply because they are
the product of an agreement. It is nonetheless important to
recognize that the conduct of the parties prior to a child’s birth
can generate reliance that is instrumental in establishing
particular family structures for the child. The reliance interests
in this context, as they affect the lives and long-term
responsibilities of intended parents in fundamental ways, are
far weightier than those that arise in the vast majority of
commercial contexts or for that matter, many other familial
contexts.
Moreover, as indicated, parentage defines a
relationship between a parent and child and should not be
identified by a perception of children’s interests in isolation
from those of their parents. The expectation and reliance
interests of intending parents are in fact relevant to children’s
best interests because they directly affect their experience of
familial stability. The failure to respect agreements that are
responsibly made and deliberately planned greatly increases the
risk of conflict in families created by assisted conception. It is
well established empirically that conflict between parents and
69
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Garrison, supra note 6 at 862-63. See also Appleton, supra note 44 at
373.

Assisted Conception and Equality

171

added stress in their lives is generally harmful for children.70 It
interrupts nurturance and undermines the quality of primary
care, especially when disputes enter the legal arena. Rules that
can provide guidelines for the secure recognition of parentage
at and from a child’s birth and the avoidance of ongoing
conflict in their lives will generally be in the interests of both
caregivers and children.
Finally, equality in terms of gender and sexual
orientation is an important value that must be taken into
account. Recognition of intending parentage that is limited to
male heterosexuals constitutes a denial of gender equity as well
as discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. 71
Singling out sole parenthood as problematic also has gender
implications because more women are single parents than
men.72 Thus, mothers and their children will be more adversely
affected by negative stereotypes attaching to the status of single
parenthood. Mothers, moreover, have by nature a more
extensive role in the reproductive process than do men.
Garrison’s formal equality approach to the regulation of
parenthood leads her to the counterintuitive outcome that
sperm donors should be recognized (except, it seems, in the
case of heterosexual intending parents) but gestational mothers
should not. 73 A failure to recognize the salient differences
between different modes of conception and the differential
involvement and interests of affected parties fails to take
account of both gender equity and significant differences in the
relational ties of mothers and fathers with their children. Since
women’s experience of procreation differs from that of men,
outcomes should not be determined simply through the
70
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Shaffer, supra note 62.
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See text accompanying notes 224-227, 239, 254-265, below.
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See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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See text accompanying notes 159-187, below.
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application of a male norm.74 Gender neutrality in this sense
amounts to a denial of gender equity and is analogous to the
long discredited view that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination, simply
because men did not experience it.75 By treating the manner of
conception and circumstances of birth as totally irrelevant to
the outcome, Garrison’s analysis not only fails to provide
mothers with gender equity but may also not fully realize
children’s best interests.
In the next section, I argue that existing parentage law
in many Canadian jurisdictions is designed around sexual
conception and leads to inappropriate outcomes in its
application to technological conception. It both fails to reflect
and promote the above values and generates irrational and
untenable outcomes for children and their caregivers.
EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND
UNTENABLE OUTCOMES
Multiple Parents and a Heterosexist Lens
Defining parentage in terms of one mother and one father
reflects conventional heterosexual procreation. It both limits
parents to two and defines them biologically according to
gender. In the reproductive context, however, parenthood is
potentially fragmented between gamete donors, gestational
mothers, and intending parents, who may be heterosexual or
same sex. These variations have only been partially recognized
in parentage law; there are both inconsistent provisions across
statutes and between jurisdictions.
74

75
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See generally Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion,
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1990).
See cases cited infra, note 264.
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Birth registration statutes have recognized the
possibility of multiple parents and the standing of intending
parents to a greater extent than legislation establishing
parentage. Over the last decade,76 vital statistics legislation in
Saskatchewan and elsewhere was amended to provide for the
registration of an intended or an “other parent.”77 This parent is
defined in the Saskatchewan Vital Statistics Act as a person
“cohabiting with the mother or father of the child in a spousal
relationship at the time of the child’s birth and who intends to
participate as a parent in the upbringing of the child.”78 In the
absence of a contest, registration is presumed to reflect the
truth of parentage and ordinarily provides the status to meet
most of the practical functions associated with parenthood such
as school registration and hospital care.
However, problems arise in some provinces if and
when parentage is challenged under statutes that allow for the
amendment of the particulars of registration in accordance with
declarations of parentage.79 A judicial declaration of parentage,
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In some jurisdictions, reform followed the decision of the Supreme
Court in Trociuk v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 SCR
835. See also MDR v Ontario (2006) 81 OR (3d) 81, 270 DLR (4th)
90; OJ No 2268 (Sup Ct); Gill v Murray [2001] BCHRTD No 34.
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See e.g. The Vital Statistics Act, 2009 SS 2009, c V-7.21, s 2(1). See
also The Vital Statistics Act CCSM, c V-60, ss 3(6), 3(6.2), 32(5);
Civil Code of Quebec, LRQ c-C-1991, art 115; Vital Statistics Act,
RSBC 1996, c 479, s 3(1.1); Birth Registration Regulations made
under s 51 of the Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, s 3(1), NS
Reg 390/2007; Vital Statistics Act, 2009, SNL 2009, c V-6.01, s 5(5);
Consolidation of Vital Statistics Act RSNWT 1988 c. V-3, s. 1,
2(2.1); Vital Statistics Act, SNWT 2011, c. 34, ss 1, 24(2); An Act to
Amend the Vital Statistics Act, Bill 74, Yukon Legislative Assembly,
ss 3-6, which comes into force on a day fixed by the Commissioner in
Executive Council.
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The Vital Statistics Act, 2009 SS 2009, c V-7.21, s 2(1).
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See e.g. The Vital Statistics Act, 2009, ibid, ss 4, 19, 20(1); CLA,
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unlike the registration of a birth, confers lifelong immutable
status as a parent along with all the rights and obligations of
parenthood. 80 The Children’s Law Reform Act in
Saskatchewan, however, does not explicitly recognize different
sources of parentage or the possibility of multiple parents,
identifying the father and mother simply as “the mother” or
“the father.”81 Because change has been piecemeal, the explicit
acknowledgment of a co-parent under The Vital Statistics Act
200982 has been made subject to inconsistent provisions within
the CLA, 1997. 83 The same inconsistency exists between
Manitoba’s statutes dealing with vital statistics and child
status.84 In Nova Scotia, a court is empowered under the Vital
Statistics Act to issue a declaratory order “with respect to the
paternity of the child” and amend the birth registration
accordingly85 but regulations pursuant to this Act permit the
mother’s spouse, male or female, to register as a legal parent
where the child is conceived with an anonymous sperm
donor.86
The use of the definite article preceding the words
“father” and “mother” has been held in some jurisdictions to
imply, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that there can
only be one declared father or one mother.87 The Ontario Court
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See AA v BB, supra note 15 at para 14.
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CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 2(1).
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Supra note 77.
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Supra note 2.
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See The Vital Statistics Act CCSM, c V-60, s 3 and The Family
Maintenance Act CCSM, c F-20, ss 19-23 [Manitoba FMA].
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Supra note 77.
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of Appeal held in AA v BB that the court could not declare a
third person a parent under the legislation itself although they
could rely on an inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to do so
when in the best interests of the child.88 Quebec and Alberta
have enacted detailed legislation that recognizes heterosexual
or same sex partners in certain circumstances, but in both
jurisdictions only two parents are contemplated.89 Indeed, in
DWH v DJR, the Court of Appeal surmised in obiter that this
express limitation could have the effect of excluding an
intending biological father from parentage in Alberta where an
intending non-biological father and a gestational mother are
recognized.90
Only British Columbia has legislation that allows for
more than two parents where all parties agree in writing to be
parents before assisted conception occurs. 91 Provided the
consent of all parties is informed and voluntary, and thus the
potential for conflict minimized, it is difficult to justify the
denial of a parental role for a third party who can function as an
additional source of financial and affective support for a
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502, 262 DLR (4th) 157 (Wilkinson J accepted the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s interpretation of similar language in the CLA, 1997, at paras
8-9, 24); Buist v Greaves [1997] OJ No 2646 (Ont Gen Div).
88

See below text accompanying notes 193-202.
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Droit de la famille 07528, 2007 QCCA 361, [2007] JQ No 1895,
leave to appeal refused [2007] CSCR No 270 at para 55. See Family
Law Act, SA 2003 c. F-4.5, s 9(7)(b) [Alberta FLA].
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Where the gestational mother does not consent to an application by
the intending biological father for a declaration, see DWH v DJR,
2013 ABCA 240, 34 RFL (7th) 27 at para 69; Fiona Kelly, “One of
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BC FLA, s 27.
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child.92 In these circumstances, recognition of three parents not
only promotes equality of familial status but also familial
security and the best interests of the child. In provinces such as
Saskatchewan, however, parties would have to seek to rely on
the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction in order to recognize
three parents; failing that, there may only be one father and
mother.93
Social Parenthood and a Biological Lens
Where only one mother and one father can be identified, which
party will be defined as such is also unsettled in some
jurisdictions. In Low v Low, a heterosexual couple planned a
pregnancy together in which the wife was artificially
inseminated by an anonymous donor.94 After the birth of the
child, the wife no longer desired the husband’s involvement.
Ferrier J found that the husband in this case could be declared
the father since section 5(3) of the Children’s Law Reform Act
provided that a court could make a declaratory order “where
[it] finds on the balance of probabilities that the relationship of
father and child has been established.” 95 Reference to the
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“relationship of father and child” was broad enough to include
a social father. Moreover, omission of the phrase “natural
father” in section 5(3), used elsewhere in the statute, suggested
that the relationship in question need not be biological. The
judge refrained from finding that the husband was a presumed
father by virtue of marriage to the mother, among other
circumstances, as he would then have had to confront the
question of whether such a presumption was rebutted in light of
the acknowledged circumstances surrounding conception.
Ferrier J also did not address the fact that the child might then
have two fathers, perhaps because the sperm donor was
anonymous and the biological father as such could never have
become known. That the CLRA “favours” but does not define
parentage solely on the basis of biology was affirmed by the
Court of Appeal in AA v BB.96
Subject to some variations, parentage legislation in
Prince Edward Island, 97 Quebec, 98 Alberta, 99 Newfoundland
and Labrador, 100 British Columbia, 101 the Northwest
Territories, 102 Nunavut, 103 and the Yukon 104 now specifically
96
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provides either for recognition of a spouse in circumstances
similar to Low v Low or a presumption of parentage in the
spouse’s favour. In Newfoundland and Labrador and the
Yukon, however, the legislation recognizes only male spouses
and as such, is liable to being challenged as discrimination on
the grounds of both sex and sexual orientation under section 15
of the Charter.105
As in Ontario, a court in New Brunswick may make a
declaratory order where “the relationship of mother [or father]
and child has been established.” 106 However, in Saunders v
MacMichael, Bastarache JA, as he then was, found that the
“relationship of mother and child” referred to a biological and
not a social relationship, and thereby disqualified a
stepdaughter from an inheritance under the Devolution of
Estates Act. 107 He noted that proof of such a maternal
relationship would be required where “a child was taken from a
mother at birth, where the mother is incapacitated and unable to
testify, or where the mother is a refugee without parents or
papers.” 108 While ‘the relationship of mother and child’ is
defined here exclusively in biological terms and not in terms of
de facto care, the outcome could well differ where the motherchild relationship is intended to be established before or at
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Ibid s 13(2); CLA, RSNL, supra note 100. See Fraese v Alberta, 2005
ABQB 889, 278 DLR (4th) 187 (a similar provision in Alberta was
found to discriminate on the grounds of sex and sexual orientation
contrary to section 15 of the Charter); MDR v Ontario, supra note 76
(the birth registry provisions in Ontario were also found to
discriminate against female same-sex parents).

106

Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s 100(2) [Family Serices
Act, SNB] (“notwithstanding that there is no person recognized in law
under section 103 to be the father” at s 100(4)).
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Saunders v MacMichael (1996), 173 NBR (2d) 49, [1996] NBJ No.
39 (NBCA).
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Ibid NBJ at para 9. See also, TTKO, SPO, GDK, 2011 ONSC 6601.
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birth. Involvement in the circumstances that bring about the
very existence of the child may reasonably imply a corollary
intention to benefit such a child through intestacy or
inheritance and to undertake all of the incidents of parentage.
As indicated in AA v BB, similar language has been interpreted
broadly to include intending lesbian mothers in Ontario with a
view to promoting equality of familial status.109
In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, there is no provision
similar to section 5(3) of the CLRA and none of the statutory
provisions refers to a “relationship of father and child.”110 In
Manitoba, a “parent” is explicitly defined to mean a “biological
parent or adoptive parent of a child and includes a person
declared to be the parent of a child.”111 This language suggests
that a declared parent must be either an actual or a likely (i.e.
presumed) biological parent of a child. In both provinces, a
declaration can only be made with respect to a finding that one
is or is recognized to be “the father” or “the mother.”112 Both
statutes also identify a number of circumstances that will give
rise to presumptions of paternity, including cohabitation with
the mother at the time of conception or birth of the child,
having signed the birth registration form or having
acknowledged that one is the father subsequent to birth. These
circumstances could in theory generate presumptions that
would result in either an intended or biological father being
declared or “recognized in law” as “the father.”113 While such
an outcome might suggest that parentage is a social or juridical
construct and not a biological one, “the ordinary meaning of
parentage” was interpreted in WJQM v AMA as signifying a
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Supra note 15.
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Manitoba FMA, supra note 84, ss 1, 19, 20.
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CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 43(2); ibid, ss 19(1), 20(1).
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CLA, 1997, supra note 2, ss 43, 45(1).
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biological relationship because it “relates to kindred (blood)
ties.” 114 In PC v SL, Wilkinson J acknowledged that the
presumptions of paternity are not explicitly grounded in
biological fact; however, she noted that the presumption “made
certain assumptions about ordinary human behavior in
circumstances where direct proof was difficult…[i]n the days
before DNA testing it was simply a method of facilitating proof
at a time before science and technology intervened with more
reliable standards.” 115 If “the factual question of
progenitorship” is central,116 the presumptions reflect at most a
likelihood of biological paternity based upon an opportunity to
impregnate the mother or a subsequent acknowledgement of
biological paternity, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
According to these cases, the CLA 1997 contemplates an actual
or likely biological connection, at least as a necessary condition
of paternity, rather than a paternal relationship that is purely
socially based.
A man in the circumstances of Mr. Low could attempt
to rely on a presumption of paternity in Saskatchewan if he had
cohabited with the birth mother at the time of conception or
birth of the child or had signed the birth registration form.
Having no other provision to rely upon, however, he would
face the possibility that any presumption in his favour would be
rebutted by the circumstances of assisted conception itself,
which would establish that he was not a biological father.117
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WJQM v AMA, 2011 SKQB 317 at paras 13, 18, 24. However, while
kindred relationships follow from a finding of parentage under the
CLA, 1997, s 40(1), they do not define it exhaustively. Compare s
40(1), a “person is the child of his or her parents,” with s 40(3)(a)
”kindred relationships are to be determined according to the
relationships described in subsection (1).”
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Supra note 87 at para 20.
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Ibid at para 17.
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While rebuttal of the presumption would seem to logically
follow, under section 43(5) of the CLA 1997, a presumption of
paternity may only be rebutted by proof that “the presumed
father is not the father and a finding that a man is the father.”118
In NMS v EBCS, Wilkinson J found that a presumed father
could not simply rely on genetic tests excluding parentage but
must also establish that someone else is in fact “the father.”119
According to Madam Justice Wilkinson, the use of the
conjunctive “and” in section 43(5) suggested that, in the
absence of a conflicting presumption,120 the presumption of
paternity on the part of the husband could not be displaced
without identifying another man as the father. Unlike Ontario,
or Manitoba for that matter, “a child cannot be declared
121
fatherless
in
Saskatchewan.”
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the claim of a lesbian co-parent, she states, “if a male person
cohabiting with the mother acknowledged that another man had
impregnated her ... the male cohabitant would similarly be required to
establish a parental relationship with the child by adoption, or to
pursue other rights not conferring “status”, such as custody and
access” at para 17. See WJQM v AMA, supra note 114, where a
presumption in favour of a gestational mother under The Vital
Statistics Act, supra note 77, s 4 (by virtue of her registration on the
statement of live birth) was rebutted by the involvement of an
anonymous egg donor.
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CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 43(5) [emphasis added]
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NMS v EBCS, 2005 SKQB 299 at para 16, 2005 SJ No 434.
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A conflicting presumption would nullify the presumption. See e.g.
CLA, 1997, supra note 2, s 57; Manitoba FMA supra note 84, s 20(5).
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Ibid at para 22. In Ontario, there is no such provision and a negative
declaration can be made under the Courts of Justice Act, s 97, which
allows a superior court to “make binding declarations of right,
whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed, see
Raft v Shortt [1986] 54 OR (2d) 768, 2 RFL (3d) 343 (OHC); JR v
LH [2002] OJ No 3998 at para 19, 117 ACWS (3d) 276 (SCJ). In
Manitoba, where the court finds on a balance of probabilities that a
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We are thus left in an untenable position: the
Saskatchewan Children’s Law Act has been interpreted as
identifying actual or likely biological paternity but a presumed
father cannot be displaced as the father unless another man is
identified as such, even if there are means to establish that the
presumed father is not the biological father. Such a constraint
resembles the stringent standards required at common law to
rebut a presumption of legitimacy 122 and supports Fiona
Kelly’s thesis that parentage legislation is primarily concerned
with “producing paternity”, along with private sources of
support for children, rather than identifying genetic
accuracy.123 In its application to cases similar to Low v Low, it
also raises a question as to whether “a man”, i.e. a person other
than the presumed father, must be capable of being specifically
identified. Where the donor is unknown, would a court in effect
be declaring a child fatherless if it found the presumption was
rebutted? But if so, why should recognition of parentage for
intending fathers/husbands depend upon whether the donor is
known or unknown? This construction would give intending
parents a powerful incentive to use anonymous over known
donors, even where they believe that use of a known or
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man is or is not the father, or a mother is or is not the mother, it can
make a declaratory order to that effect, Manitoba FMA supra, note
84, ss 20(3), 19(2).
122

This burden of proof, along with evidentiary rules that denied spouses
a right to testify as to the illegitimacy of a child born during their
marriage, was strongly indicative of a tendency to accept the most
likely and available father. Roxanne Mykitiuk notes that “[b]y
conflating the relationship between natural and social facts and
construing them together as ‘natural,’ law reiterates and embeds these
social constructions within the way we order our relations.” Roxanne
Mykitiuk, “Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in
the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies” (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 771 at 776, 781.
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Kelly, “Producing Paternity”, supra note 13 at 317, 325, 329, 330.
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identity-release donor to establish the child’s genealogy might
be in his or her best interests at some future point in time.
Lesbian couples relying on assisted conception would
also encounter difficulties in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and in
those jurisdictions like the Yukon, Newfoundland and
Labrador, where statutes specifically address assisted
conception only in relation to male heterosexual partners.124
First, as in PC v SL, the non-biological lesbian co-parent in
Saskatchewan or Manitoba would face the argument that only
one mother can be recognized under the CLA, 1997. 125
Secondly, the presumptions only apply on their face to
paternity, not maternity. Even if these presumptions were
found to offend the Charter,126 the co-parent would face the
same prospect of any presumption arising from his or her
registration as a parent under vital statistics legislation being
rebutted given the facts surrounding conception. Finally, if a
child cannot be declared fatherless in Saskatchewan where a
male applicant seeks to displace a presumption of paternity,
would the same rationale be applied to preclude lesbian
intending parents or single mothers from being declared the
exclusive parents of a child?127 In all of these instances, there
are not only concerns with a violation of gender equity but also
a denial of equality of familial status and familial security.
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See supra note 105.
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Supra, note 87. See CLA, 1997, supra note 2, ss 43(2)(b), 43(3) (both
referencing “the mother”). See also Buist v Greaves, supra note 87
(holding that reference to “the mother” means there can only be one).
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See below text accompanying notes 261-62.
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If section 43(5) was restricted to presumptions of paternity, a court
could rely on s 11 of The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998 (1998 SS c Q1.01) which authorizes declarations in terms identical to s 97 of the
Ontario Courts of Justice Act, (supra note 123).
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This failure to address the relative claims of intending
and genetic fathers or mothers, particularly where the donor
was known, would also expose the child and all affected parties
to instability where an intending parent changed his or her
mind and decided to withdraw from the relationship during
pregnancy or upon the birth of the child.128 The remaining
parent could potentially lack a valid claim to child support
where there either was no factual basis for a presumption or
where the presumption was rebutted. Such an outcome would
frustrate the expectations and reliance interests of the
remaining parent and deprive the child of a source of support
without any corresponding benefit, unless a known donor could
be found liable or unless the intending parent could be found at
some future point to stand in the place of a parent.129
The Status of Gamete Donors
Low v Low raised the question of the status of intending
fathers, but what of the status of identifiable sperm or egg
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See e.g. Jaycee B v John B 42 Cal App 4th 718 (1996), 49 Cal (2d)
694. This case involved six contracting parties including the
intending parents (both husband and wife were infertile), an egg and
sperm donor and a gestational mother. While the gestational mother
was pregnant, the intending parents separated and the intending father
moved to a different state and refused to pay support after the child’s
birth. He disputed liability on the basis of lack of parentage and none
of the other possible parents wanted the responsibility with the
exception of the intending mother. While the court found the
intending father liable on the basis of the agreement, how would such
a case be decided in Saskatchewan?
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In DWH v DJR, supra note 90, the male partner of the biological
father of the child had, in an earlier proceeding, been awarded
reasonable access to the child on the grounds that he had parented the
child for 3 years and was in loco parentis to the child. In subsequent
proceedings, he was granted a declaration of parentage when the
court invoked its parens patriae jurisdiction as part of a Charter
remedy.
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donors where they do not want or the intending parents do not
want them to have parental status after the birth of the child?
Should they have rights to access and custody or obligations to
pay support?130
Provincial jurisdictions, again, have addressed these
issues to varying degrees and with inconsistent outcomes.
Interestingly, not as many provinces have moved to clarify the
status of sperm donors as have legislated to give social parents
standing, which is consistent with efforts to enlarge the net of
individual financial responsibility and privatized support. 131
Those jurisdictions that have specifically legislated on the
donation of sperm or ova through assisted conception,
however, have allowed for the possibility that donors lack
parental status. In Alberta, only the birth mother and the
partner who consented to be a parent would be parents.132 In
Quebec, a third party who contributes genetic material by way
of assisted conception for a “parental project” (that is not his
own) will not have the status of a parent.133 In Newfoundland
and Labrador, the sperm donor is not a father if not married to
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Two related questions are important but beyond the scope of this
article, i.e. whether sperm donors should be treated differently than
egg donors since egg donorship entails a more onerous and dangerous
process that can have serious health risks (see Cameron, Gruben &
Kelly, supra note 67 at 105) and what formalities, if any, should
govern relinquishment of claims arising from a genetic tie in advance
of birth (as opposed to after birth).
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Only 5/10 as opposed to 7/10.
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Alberta FLA, supra note 89, s 8.1(5).
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CCQ, supra note 98, Art 538.2. Three conditions must be met: “there
must be a parental project formed by one or two persons, the sperm
donor must not be a party to this project, and the donor must
knowingly act as an assistant to the project that is not his own,” Droit
de la famille 07528, supra note 89 at para 34; Droit de la famille
111729 LB and EB v GN, 2011 QCCA 1180, [2011] QJ No 7881,
leave to appeal refused [2011] SCCA No 444.
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or cohabiting with the mother at the time of artificial
insemination134 and in both Prince Edward Island and British
Columbia, a donor of sperm or ovum is not a parent by reason
of the donation alone.135 In the latter three jurisdictions, the
parental status of a donor is lost only if the child is conceived
through assisted conception rather than sexual intercourse; in
Quebec, a donor by way of sexual intercourse has twelve
months after the birth of the child to establish filiation, in
which case the parental status of the spouse of the birth mother
may be extinguished.136 In Droit de la famille – 111729 LB and
EB v GN, Rochon J noted that the absence of formalities (such
as a legal agreement and written consent) in Quebec poses
“evidentiary difficulties, particularly when this juridical act is
that of a woman alone and when the genetic material is
provided by way of sexual intercourse.”137
In jurisdictions that have not legislated in this regard,
such as Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba, and New
Brunswick, either a sperm or egg donor could still be found to
be a biological father or mother and declared as such over (or
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CLA, RSNL, supra note 100, s 12(6).
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BC FLA, supra note 20, s 24(1); Child Status Act, supra note 97, s
9(6).
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CCQ, supra note 98, Art 538.2, para 2. See Leckey, supra note 98 at
588. Some states, e.g. Kansas, require that assisted conception occur
under clinical or medical supervision.
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Supra note 133 at para 6 and see para 64. In this case, the mother had
died and her parents were unable to contradict the biological father’s
claims. He was found not to have expressly agreed to limit his role to
that of a genetic contributor. The fact that he had been paid a
“reward” for his contribution and did not want to and had not
supported the child financially did not prevent recognition of his
paternity, at para 62. See also SG c LC [2004] RJQ 6915 (Sup Ct);
Droit de la famille 07527 2007 QCCA 362 (intending lesbian
partners were denied parentage in favour of biological fathers).
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along with) the intending or commissioning parties. Donorship
could then give rise to significant rights and obligations.
Donors could be liable for child support, a long lasting and
substantial financial obligation. As a result of the Court of
Appeal decision in Schick v Woodrow, joint legal custody in
Saskatchewan is presumptively in a child’s best interests when
claimed by an interested and available non-cohabiting
biological parent.138 The impact of an agreement with a known
donor on his claim to access to the child after birth has only
been dealt with on an interim basis in Ontario.139 In disputed
cases, restricting parentage to only one mother and father could
lead to the exclusion of the non-biological parent, absent
reliance on parens patriae or a Charter claim.140
On the face of the Saskatchewan CLA, 1997, it would
seem that any agreement excluding parentage would be
irrelevant to one’s status as a parent. As indicated, agreements
respecting children in the context of sexual conception have
been held not to bind a court.141 However, the assumption that
a known sperm donor has the status of a parent has been
questioned in some cases. In PC v SL, Wilkinson J appeared to
suggest that biological paternity is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of parentage. 142 She noted that parental
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2012 SKCA 1 at para 25, 385 Sask R 153, rev’g 2009 SKQB 167,
[2009] SJ No 366.

139

See DeBlois v Lavigne, 2012 ONSC 3949 (access by the donor was
denied but the case was thereafter settled out of court).
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Bird, supra note 13 at 281 and Boyd, “Gendering,” supra note 3 at
77.
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Wright v Zaver, [2002] 59 OR (3d) 26, 211 DLR (4th) 260 (CA) at
paras 27-28. See also Doe v Alberta, 2007 ABCA 50 at para 26, 404
AR 153, leave to appeal refused [2007] SCCA No 211 in the context
of step-parent status.
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Supra note 87. See also Buschow v Jors, supra note 51,
acknowledging that sperm donorship may justify curtailment of child
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status “is not simply an issue of biological connection” and
cited with approval the US Supreme Court in Lehr v Robertson,
which held that the “importance of the familial relationship to
the individuals involved, and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association…as well as from the fact of blood relationship.”143
Based on this commentary, there is some scope within which to
argue that a mere sperm or egg donor should not be assigned
parentage.
In Johnson-Steeves v Lee, the Alberta Court of Appeal
also gave substantial weight to the finding of the trial judge that
the father had not agreed to be a mere sperm donor prior to
birth in affirming his entitlement to an access order. 144
According to the Court, “[t]he respondent is not an anonymous
faceless figure who has donated sperm by whatever means and
shown no other interest in the child…the respondent did not
agree that he would have no role to play in his child’s life.”145
In finding the intended role of the biological father relevant to
the issue of access (normally governed only by the best
interests of the child), the appellate court’s position suggests
that the existence of an agreement to exclude parental rights
and obligations to donors before birth might also be relevant to
a finding of parental status.146 Kelly, however, notes that courts
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support obligations, at para 7.
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436 US 248 at 260, 103 Sup Ct 2985 at 2992, cited at para 21.
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[1997] AJ No 1057, 209 AR 292 (CA) at para 18.
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Ibid at para 16.
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But see Stevenson v Egeland [1995] AJ No 1296 (QB) where an
agreement between the mother and a friend that he was to impregnate
her but not pay child support did not prevent an action against him by
the social welfare agency that provided social assistance to the
mother. An analogy to a sperm bank was rejected because the donor
lacked anonymity and there was no public policy in favour of nonsupport.
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tend to be less willing to sever the rights of biological fathers
where women have conceived outside of traditional
heterosexual relationships. As well, she indicates that courts
are more willing to allow sperm donors to renege on prior
agreements and seek a role in parenting where the intending
parents are lesbian as opposed to heterosexual or where the
intending parent is single. 147 Resistance may be tempered,
however, where discretion is highly restricted through statutory
provisions and agreements to relinquish status are very
explicit.148
As previously discussed, Garrison argues that single
women should not be able to parent autonomously of biological
fathers by choice or agreement because women who conceive
sexually have no such choice and “there is no obvious reason
why paternity laws should mandate different results when
women conceive using AID and when women conceive
sexually.”149 Contrary to Garrison’s assertions, however, the
“mechanics of conception” may be highly relevant to
“relational realities.”150 Holding men responsible in instances
of casual sex may, at least in theory, promote an equal sense of
responsibility for the potential consequences of sexual
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Kelly, “Producing Paternity,” supra note 13, (regarding lesbian
mothers at 340-49 and citing resistance to severance of a donor’s
legal rights in the case of a single mother at 337). See Caulfield v
Wong 2007 ABQB 732.
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Kelly, “Equal Families”, supra note 13, citing Droit de la famille
07528, supra note 133 as a successful lesbian case and noting that
Quebec and BC are the only jurisdictions to recognize the possibility
of a single parent family created through assisted conception, at para
46.
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Supra note 6 at 903 (there is “no logical basis for a one-parent policy
applicable only to single AID users” at 910 where AID connotes
artificial insemination donation).

150

Ibid at 903.
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intercourse. 151 By contrast, assisted conception is typically
highly planned and deliberate, especially when executed in a
clinical setting, and usually indicative of a very high level of
responsibility on the part of both donors and intended parents.
Moreover, the frustration or upending of stable expectations
and reliance interests can generate extreme stress and conflict
which, given the intimate interdependence of parent and child,
can harm all affected parties. Allowing heterosexual couples
but not lesbian or single mothers to block paternity claims by
sperm donors also reinforces a hierarchical ordering of family
forms.152
Lack of provision for the status of sperm or egg donors
thus constitutes another gap that has problematic implications
for parents and children in some jurisdictions. At present, the
only sure way to protect against breach of a settled
arrangement is to use anonymous donors. In this event, the
child will have no knowledge of his or her biological father or
mother and no ability to have any contact with him or her.
Although disputed, in Pratten v BC, Adair J found some
evidence that such an outcome could be harmful for some
children. 153 There is also evidence that lesbian couples are

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

151

Alternatively, Sally Sheldon argues that biological fathers should not
be held liable for child support in clear cases of misrepresentation by
mothers of their use of birth control, “Unwilling Fathers and
Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?” (2003) 66
Modern Law Rev 175. Others might argue that sexual intercourse
creates an inherent risk of conception.

152

See supra, text accompanying notes 42-66.
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2011 BCSC 656 at paras 85-89, rev’d 2012 BCCA 480 on the
question of Charter breach, leave to appeal refused [2013] SCCA No
36. But see Lori Chambers & Heather Hillsburg, “Desperately
Seeking Daddy: A Critique of Pratten v. BC (AG)” (2013) 28 Can J
L Soc 229 (argue that Adair J. failed to distinguish between harm
caused by secrecy and anonymity, with only the former necessarily
reinforcing stigma, and that evidence of harm as a result of
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more likely than heterosexual couples to use known sperm
donors, preferably gay men, or donors under identity-release
conditions, so that children are able to access knowledge about
their genetic father or allow for his involvement at some future
point.154 Cameron, Gruben & Kelly suggest that the failure to
provide certainty through legislation could end up harming
children by driving intended parents away from known
donors.155
Given the neoliberal emphasis on privatized support
over the last few decades, it is interesting that judges and
legislators have to such a significant extent excused gamete
donors from liability. Appleton questions why “sperm donors
need not pay the tax that sexually conceived unmarried fathers
must pay” and suggests that this reveals the “limits of the
privatization of dependency as family law’s theoretical
foundation” in favor of the regulation of sex as a core value of
contemporary family law in the United States. 156 But her
analysis fails to address why governments are interested in
regulating sexual conduct and what objectives or interests are
thereby served. Kelly’s analysis suggests that the reluctance to
hold sperm donors liable may be more pronounced in the
context of more conventional two-parent heterosexual
households.157 The policy can also be indirectly linked to a
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See Leckey, supra note 98 at 590; Kelly, “(Re)forming Parenthood,”
supra note 68 at 190; Droit de la famille – 111729, supra note 133
(where the Quebec appellate court considered the biological father’s
access to the child a neutral fact since some involvement may have
been desired short of recognition of paternity at para 60).
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privatization agenda given its emphasis on the allocation of
individual responsibility through private ordering.158
The Status of Gestational Mothers
Further difficulties arise in identifying mothers since
motherhood can now be fragmented into genetic, gestational
and intending motherhood. Even fewer jurisdictions have
specifically addressed the implications of gestational
arrangements than is the case with gamete donation. In Alberta
and British Columbia, the gestational mother will be
recognized as the mother unless she consents to loss of status
after the birth of the child. 159 In both provinces, to have
parental status as intending parents, the child must be
conceived by assisted conception and in British Columbia, the
intending parents must also have assumed care of the child
after birth. In Prince Edward Island, by contrast, there is no
provision for consent and a gestational mother is expressly
deemed to be the mother whether or not she is the genetic
mother. 160 Because the Civil Code also does not recognize
surrogacy arrangements, the gestational mother is also
invariably recognized as the mother in Quebec and the nonbiological co-parent must seek status as an adoptive parent.161
All of these jurisdictions, as well as the proposed
Uniform Child Status Act162, recognize the significance of the
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In other contexts, see Ronen Shamir, “The age of responsibilization:
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gestational mother’s role and, in sharp contrast to the treatment
of sperm donors, subject the removal of her status at the very
least to her consent after birth. The differential treatment of
sperm donors and gestational mothers responds to real
differences in the experience of each in the process of
procreation. It not only ensures that there is a legal parent who
can provide consent for medical treatment for the child but also
allows for the possibility that the gestational mother may have
changed her mind through and as a result of gestation. 163
Where the gestational mother does not consent to either the
parentage of the social parent or adoption, a social parent may
presumably acquire the status of a step-parent with more
limited rights and responsibilities.
In other provinces and the territories, surrogacy
arrangements are not addressed by statute. Virtually all cases in
these jurisdictions have proceeded by the consent of all the
affected parties and declaratory orders have been issued. All
such cases appear to recognize some degree of discretion in
granting orders but factors influencing the exercise of
discretion have varied and different approaches by the courts
will raise concerns with gender equity and again generate
familial instability and uncertainty in the event of conflict.
In a recent Saskatchewan case, WJQM v AMA, a child
was conceived using the egg of an anonymous donor that was
fertilized by one of the two intending fathers.164 The fertilized
egg was then implanted in the womb of another woman who
delivered the child. The Vital Statistics Act 2009 defines a
father as a “person who acknowledges himself to be the
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On information deficiencies at the time of contracting, see e.g. Molly
J Walker Wilson, “Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation:
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biological father” and mother as the woman “from whom a
child is delivered.”165 Thus the child was registered under the
names of the genetic father and gestational mother. Under
section 29, however, the registration of live birth could be
amended if a court made a determination of “parentage” with
respect to a child.166
Upon such an application, Ryan-Froslie J held that
“parentage” in the CLA, 1997 referred to lineage and that “the
mother of a child” in provisions authorizing declarations as to
parentage referred to:
…a child’s biological mother. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the ordinary
view of parentage which relates to kindred
(blood) ties. It is also consistent with the
provisions of Part VI of The Children’s Law Act,
1997 relating to a declaration of parentage with
respect to a child’s father for which the Court
may order genetic testing. It would be
inconsistent to view the biological father as a
parent and not the biological mother.167
Given the involvement of an anonymous egg donor,
the presumption in favour of the gestational mother by virtue of
her registration on the statement of live birth was rebutted.
Ryan-Froslie J noted that she was “also satisfied neither the
applicants nor Mary [the gestational mother] ever intended that
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Mary would assume any parental rights or obligations with
respect to Sarah [the child]. As such, a declaration that Mary is
not Sarah’s mother is warranted.”168
The finding that “mother” referred to a genetic mother
rather than the birth or gestational mother not only departs
from the definition under vital statistics legislation but also the
conventional definition of a mother in the civil, if not the
common law, traditions. 169 Where maternity is fragmented,
both genetic and gestational mothers participate in the
biological process of producing a child and the gestational
mother, by any measure, is far more intimately involved in that
process for a much longer period of time.170 By basing her
definition of motherhood on the experience of a biological
father and using that as the norm for comparison, Ryan-Froslie
J ignored obvious and salient differences between the
reproductive experiences of mothers and fathers. Since only
one mother can be identified by statute as “the mother”,171 the
identification of the genetic mother as such would appear to bar
future claims by gestational mothers who do not consent to the
loss of maternal status after birth.
Because the egg donor was anonymous, the Court did
not have to deal with a potential claim between the egg donor
and the intending non-biological (in this case, male) parent. An
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exclusive statutory emphasis on biological definitions of
parenthood, however, implies that a court could not identify a
female social parent as the mother where the egg donor is
known, whether or not there is a contest between the parties.
Where the donor is unknown, WJQM v AMA also highlights a
contradiction in the statutory treatment of mothers and fathers.
The child in this case was effectively declared motherless on
the basis that the judge had the authority under section 43(2)(b)
of the CLA, 1997 to find that “a woman is or is not in law the
mother of the child.” When it comes to fathers, however, a
child cannot be declared fatherless.172 Why it should be more
important to recognize fathers than mothers was left
unaddressed.
In JAW v JEW, a New Brunswick court declared a
heterosexual couple who were the genetic parents to be the
parents of a child born to a gestational mother, who was the
sister of the female applicant and who had consented to the
declaration.173 As in WJQM v AMA, Walsh J defined biological
in genetic terms and found that the provisions of the relevant
Family Services Act “obviously contemplate declarations for
biological (genetic) parents.”174 There was “no good reason in
law or public policy” not to issue a declaration, but rather
“compelling reasons” to do so in light of the significant
benefits that would flow from an immutable recognition of
parental-child status.175 Walsh J did note, however, that the
extent to which the Court’s jurisdiction to make parentage
declarations was “confined to biological (“genetic”)
relationships” was not at issue.176
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In Ontario and British Columbia, (prior to the recent
enactment of the Family Law Act), courts relied on a general
power to grant equitable declaratory relief as to legal status in
dealing with surrogacy arrangements. In Rypkema v BC, a
genetic mother was declared the mother where this was
consistent with the best interests of the child and the intentions
and consent of all parties.177 In BAN v JH, Metzger J issued a
declaratory order in favour of a genetic father and an intending
mother with the consent of the gestational mother and a known
egg donor, in order to avoid the expense, delay and uncertainty
of adoption proceedings.178 In Ontario, judges relied on their
parens patriae jurisdiction in KGD v CAP, in ordering that a
child be registered under the name of the biological father as
the sole parent, without mention of the anonymous egg donor
and gestational mother 179 and in MD v LL, Nelson J went
further to issue a declaration that the gestational mother was
not a mother, having found that certainty and stability of
parenthood was in the best interests of the child180 .
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In all of the above cases, the affected parties had
consented to the parentage ordered. A declaration has been
refused in such circumstances in only one reported case in
Manitoba, where the pre-birth declaration sought by the
intending parents was found not to be authorized by statute.181
In JR v LH, Kiteley J noted that if a conflict between the
gestational and genetic mothers had existed, she would have
had to consider whether more than one mother could be
declared.182 In the only reported case in Canada involving a
contest with the gestational/genetic mother, the intending
parents who had care of the child since birth were given interim
custody but the case did not proceed to trial.183 The paucity of
litigation may reflect a high incidence of satisfactory outcomes
but it may also be attributed to financial cost or a perceived low
prospect of success.184 Busby and Vun note that most of the
empirical evidence to date suggests that gestational mothers are
generally satisfied with their role in the process and detach
early in the pregnancy.185 Nonetheless, there are cases where
gestational mothers have bonded or attached during pregnancy,
experienced distress and refused to relinquish the child,
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contrary to the expectations of all parties.186 Special provision
for gestational mothers responds to gender equity by
recognizing the significant role played by them in the life of the
newborn child, the effort and risks of gestation and the inability
to predict accurately the consequences of conception, including
the occurrence of pre-natal bonding.187
Summary
The cases discussed in this Part represent attempts to deal with
the failure on the part of most legislatures to grapple
comprehensively with the unique challenges posed by
reproductive technologies. By statute, multiple parents are
recognized only in British Columbia; while intending parents
are recognized in eight jurisdictions, in the Yukon,
Newfoundland and Labrador, only male spouses qualify.
Outcomes remain highly uncertain in New Brunswick,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan and in the latter jurisdiction also
appear subject to an overriding requirement that a child not be
declared fatherless. In five jurisdictions, known gamete donors
do not acquire parental status purely by reason of their
donation but their status in others is unclear, with the use of
anonymous donors being the only sure way of ensuring familial
security. Gestational mothers are recognized as mothers in four
jurisdictions but in many others their status, in the event of a
contest, would also be uncertain. In Saskatchewan, maternity
has to date been interpreted solely in genetic terms which may
thereby prevent recognition of parentage by a gestational
mother but also an intending social mother, even where the
genetic or gestational mother consented to a loss of parentage.
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In addition to generating familial insecurity and
inequality in these varied contexts, inconsistencies in outcomes
across jurisdictions lead to forum shopping.188 Below, I assess
the extent to which reliance on the doctrine of parens patriae
can mitigate harmful outcomes and facilitate the well being of
children in the absence of legislative reform.
LEGISLATIVE GAPS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
PARENS PATRIAE
A superior court has an inherent jurisdiction to act in the best
interests of vulnerable parties, including children, where a
legislature has failed to do so. The scope of this jurisdiction is
undefined and potentially broad. 189 In early cases involving
children born to unmarried parents, superior courts relied on
their equitable jurisdiction to grant fathers’ rights to custody
and access and did so without inquiring into the Legislature’s
intentions.190 Recent cases, however, suggest that although the
child need not be at immediate risk,191 intervention must both
be necessary to protect the child’s welfare192 and the failure on
the part of the Legislature to act must not have been
deliberate.193 While reliance on the parens patriae jurisdiction
of superior courts has provided a way of dealing with claims
related to reproductive technologies in the absence of
legislative reform, it is not a panacea.
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In AA v BB, the Ontario Court of Appeal drew on
Beson v Newfoundland194 in finding a legislative gap that could
be remedied through the exercise of the court’s inherent parens
patriae jurisdiction. 195 The Court declared the biological
mother and father as well as the lesbian co-partner of the
mother parents of a child even though the legislation in
question explicitly recognized only two parents. According to
the Court, when the current CLRA was enacted in 1978 in
Ontario, the unique challenges posed by reproductive
technologies were generally unknown and unforeseen. 196
Although reliance on parens patriae generated an outcome
inconsistent with the express and unambiguous language of the
statute, the statute itself was based on a limited premise and
was never intended to deal with assisted conception.
As discussed, there are several potential gaps in
conventional parentage legislation across Canada. Statutes in
several jurisdictions do not address the possibility of multiple
parents and even more jurisdictions fail to address the relative
roles and responsibilities of sperm and egg donors, gestational
mothers and intending parents. Were these gaps intended? It
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seemed important to the Appeal Court in AA v BB to determine
“whether the CLRA was intended to be a complete code and, in
particular, whether it was intended to confine declarations of
parentage to biological or genetic relationships.”197 In the latter
event, “it would be difficult to find that there is a legislative
gap, at least as concerns persons with no genetic or biological
link to the child.”198 Moreover, according to some cases, the
gap must be filled in a manner consistent with the legislative
intent or the scheme of the Act as a whole.199 Although the
court in AA v BB found that the CLRA “favours biological
parents”, it “does not define parentage solely on the basis of
biology.” 200 By contrast, whether the legislation in other
provinces, particularly Saskatchewan and Manitoba, is based
on a biological norm is arguably not as clear.
However, the Ontario court went on to find that a
legislative gap could exist even if the CLRA was intended to
limit declarations to biological parents provided the issue of
reproductive technologies and assisted conception had not been
contemplated or foreseen by the legislature. In 1978, when
Ontario moved to abolish illegitimacy, developments in
reproductive technologies were “beyond the vision” of the
Legislature.201 “There is nothing in the legislative history of the
CLRA to suggest that the Legislature made a deliberate policy
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choice to exclude the children of lesbian mothers from the
advantages of equality of status accorded to other children
under the Act.”202
Obviously, parens patriae cannot generally be relied
upon in provinces that have recently legislated in relation to
assisted conception. 203 In other jurisdictions, it must be
established that the failure to address assisted conception was
not contemplated at the time existing legislation was
enacted.204 The Saskatchewan CLA, for example, was amended
to abolish the status of illegitimacy in 1990, 12 years after the
Ontario Legislature. 205 Reproductive technologies were not
common but were in use. Indeed, the Saskatchewan Law
Reform Commission had, as early as 1981, proposed specific
legislation dealing with the legal position of all parties relying
on artificial insemination.206 As well, failure to legislate on
reproductive technologies constitutes a substantial, rather than
a minor, gap in parentage law. 207 Nonetheless, there is no
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evidence in debates preceding the passage of the CLA in 1990
that the Legislature specifically contemplated the existence of
these technologies or made a deliberate choice as to their
impact in enacting the Act. Like the Ontario Court of Appeal,
courts in other provinces may also not be prepared to assign “a
discriminatory intent [to the Legislature] in a statute designed
to treat all children equally” and may find it necessary to
protect the best interests of a child in such situations.208 As
Nicholas Bala and Robert Leckey note, in the family law
context Charter values may indirectly influence superior courts
in their interpretation of the law or their exercise of parens
patriae jurisdiction.209
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Assuming a legislative gap can be established, each
individual case will then be decided in terms of the best
interests of the child in question. 210 Although others may
incidentally benefit, the parens patriae jurisdiction is to be
exercised for the benefit of the protected person, not for the
benefit of others.211 This approach can provide the flexibility to
recognize gamete donors, gestational mothers and intending
parents where and when it accords with the child’s welfare,
taking into account agreements and disagreements between
parties, as well as other relevant factors. Retaining discretion in
this manner is arguably a better option than interpreting a
statute narrowly or in ways that can generate unwelcome
results for future parties, as may follow in the wake of WJQM v
AMA.
However, deciding these issues on a case by case basis
may still leave parties without general rules to guide their
conduct and shape their expectations. Where parens patriae
has been relied upon, judges have generally not undertaken an
extensive examination of the child’s best interests but have
concluded, rather summarily, that the latter will be served by
certainty and stability.212 In virtually all such cases, the relevant
parties have consented or had long established relationships
with the children. In MDR v Ontario, Rivard J held that
because the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction was limited
to an individual remedy, the Court could not consider the best
interests of children not before it nor bind others whose claims
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had to be determined on an individual basis.213 Thus, what is in
the best interests of each individual child could potentially
depend upon a host of particular factors including the existence
of conflict and the relative parental capacity and economic
status of the parties. This highly discretionary approach will
not resolve inconsistencies between jurisdictions nor promote
family security and reduce conflict for children generally.214
Moreover, because parens patriae looks solely to a
determination of a child’s best interests, outcomes need not be
grounded in nor necessarily reflect the principle of equal
familial status. In MDR v Ontario, Rivard J noted that in
deciding cases on a best interests standard, judges “may fail to
consider other important legislative objectives.”215 Outcomes
that depend solely upon the best interests of a child have the
potential to render significant interests of prospective primary
parents, including an interest in gender equity, irrelevant, and
to ignore or understate the critical intersection of parental
interests with the well-being of the child. Admittedly, the
Ontario appellate court in AA v BB did interpret its parens
patriae powers in light of equality of familial status and more
recently, in dealing with legislation pre-dating the current
Family Law Act in Alberta, the Court of Appeal concluded that
“it is not in a child's best interests for her parent to be denied
the same benefits that flow automatically to heterosexual
parents.”216 Although the Alberta Court appeared to grasp the
relational quality of the interests at stake in finding that
“children benefit when the law recognizes the reality of their
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family situations, even when that reality falls outside the
norm”,217 such outcomes are not guaranteed in all cases.
If the exercise of a court’s parens patriae jurisdiction
is inadequate, can a more adequate response be compelled
through a Charter challenge? Challenges to the status of
illegitimacy under the Charter were influential in finally
abolishing discriminatory provisions in relation to child
maintenance and inheritance in some jurisdictions. In the next
section, I briefly sketch the constitutional dimensions of a
principle of equality of familial status under section 15 of the
Charter and identify the potential barriers to success that exist
in the context of assisted conception.
SECTION 15 OF THE CHARTER
The general issue to be assessed in the context of assisted
conception is whether the failure of some jurisdictions to
recognize an intending, social parent as a parent either in lieu
of or in addition to the genetic or gestational parents constitutes
an infringement of section 15 the Charter.218
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Section 15 guarantees the equal protection and benefit
of the law without discrimination on both enumerated and
analogous grounds. 219 Arguably, children and parents in
heterosexual biologically-related families have rules that
directly apply to and govern their situation but parents using
and children born of assisted conception in some jurisdictions
are deprived of these benefits and exposed to arbitrary and
uncertain outcomes. Since Kapp,220 and Withler,221 two primary
questions are to be addressed under section 15: does the law
create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous
ground, and does the distinction create a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? More recently, a
majority of the Court made clear in Quebec v A that prejudice
and stereotyping are not “discrete elements of the test” that
need to be proven by a plaintiff but rather potential indicia of
disadvantage more generally due to membership in an
enumerated or analogous group.222
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In relation to the first issue, potential grounds of
discrimination in the assisted conception context that may be
relied upon, either singly or in combination, include sex, sexual
orientation, marital or family status and manner of conception.
In Corbiere v Canada, the Supreme Court identified an
analogous ground as a “personal characteristic that is
immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal
identity.” 223 Sexual orientation 224 and marital status 225 have
clearly been identified as analogous grounds under section 15,
but family status and manner of conception have yet to be
considered by the Supreme Court. Laws in relation to
illegitimacy were frequently challenged on the basis of
discrimination against “unmarried females” 226 and in a few
cases, single fathers, on the grounds of both sex and marital
status.227 Children were able to rely on the circumstances of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

223

Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian & Northern Affairs), [1999] 2
SCR 203 at para 13, 173 DLR (4th) 1, McLachlin & Bastarache JJ (as
McLachlin was then).

224

Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609; Vriend v
Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385; Williams v Haugen,
[1988] SJ No 732, 55 DLR (4th) 720 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC
refused [1989] 1 SCR ix.

225

Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693; Nova Scotia
(Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325;
Quebec v A, supra note 224; Jackson v Zaruba 2013 BCCA 81,
[2013] 28 RFL (7th) 289.

226

Williams v Haugen, supra note 224; Bomboir v Harlow, [1987] 5
WWR 55, [1987] SJ No 304; Gorzen v Litz, [1988] 4 WWR 763, 50
DLR (4th) 758 (SKCA); LK v TWL, [1988] BCJ No 3101, 31 BCLR
(2d) 41; Panko v Vandesype, [1993] SJ No 132, 101 DLR (4th) 726.
See also Friesen v Gregory, [1986] SJ No 662, 55 Sask R 245,
Dickson J (justifying the restriction of CUPA legislation under s
15(2) as “single mothers who choose to raise their children are
disadvantaged” at para 14).

227

See e.g. NM v BC (Superintendent of Family and Child Services,
(1986) 34 DLR (4th) 488, [1987] 3 WWR 176 (BCSC) (that consent

210

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 28]!

their birth in several instances as well, as this was seen as a
matter in which they were “entirely helpless.” 228 Children born
‘out of wedlock’ were also easily characterized as a discrete
and insular minority.229
More recently, the British Columbia Superior Court in
Pratten v BC found that manner of conception was an
analogous ground in an action by a person conceived through
assisted conception who sought disclosure of records
identifying sperm donors. 230 Arguably, the loss of secure
parentage in assisted conception, like the loss of citizenship
because of the gender of one’s parent or a loss of benefits
linked to a mother’s marital status,231 is a loss suffered directly
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by the child and as such, is not a case of discrimination by
association (where a person is relying on the identity of another
who has wholly suffered the disadvantage).232
Gruben and Gilbert, however, suggest that family
status would provide a more solid basis than manner of
conception upon which to launch a case involving assisted
conception because it is more apt to be seen as a distinction
that perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping or that identifies a
group subject to historical discrimination. 233 Manner of
conception, as evident in Marsha Garrison’s endorsement of
identical outcomes in relation to both sexual and technological
conception, may also generate a formal equality analysis.
Elaine Craig has similarly argued that reliance on family status
rather than sexual orientation is more likely to avoid a formal
equality approach to section 15 and to promote recognition of
familial relationships that deviate from the heterosexual
norm.234 However, manner of conception need not rely upon a
sameness model if the failure to take account of salient
differences related to the manner of conception itself is found
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to be discriminatory. The existence, for example, of agreements
and the extent of involvement or degree to which interests of
the parties are affected by the particular manner of conception
itself should be considered relevant.235 Manner of conception
may also be more broadly conceived of in terms of
circumstances of birth, a ground which was relied on by
children considered ‘illegitimate’ in the past.
Nonetheless, family status may better reflect the
socially imputed sense of inferiority or deficiency and shame
that has historically been used as a basis for stereotyping
families that deviate from the conventional two-parent
heterosexual model. Family status may also better capture the
relational quality of the interests at issue and the negative
impact of non-recognition on children as well as other family
members. Moreover, it can encompass a range of varied
circumstances. The Federal Court of Appeal in Thibaudeau v R
identified the status of a separated custodial parent as an
incident or component of family status, and noted “the fact that
family status or some similar expression figures as a prohibited
ground of discrimination in most human rights statutes also
serves to confirm its analogous nature to the grounds
enumerated in the Charter.” 236 Most human rights statutes
prohibit discrimination on the basis of family status but do not
define it. Legislation in Saskatchewan and Ontario define
family status as the “status of being in a parent and child
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relationship”,237 which begs the question of how a parent-child
relationship itself should be defined. 238 Courts have also
referenced single motherhood as an established source of
prejudice and discrimination, although this has usually been
identified as discrimination on the grounds of sex and marital
status rather than family status.239
Non-biological parenthood may also qualify as an
incident of family status but the claims of adoptive parents
have not met with uniform success under the Charter. While
adoptive parenthood was identified as an analogous ground at
trial in Schafer v Canada, the appellate court questioned,
though it did not determine, whether adoptive motherhood
constituted an immutable characteristic or identified a discrete
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minority that has suffered stereotyping or prejudice. 240
Biological parents have in fact been found to be victims of
discrimination where greater benefits were provided to
adoptive parents.241 Biology has also been given weight in the
allocation of parental rights such as custody and access to
children242 and biological fatherhood was given constitutional
status in Trociuk v BC in relation to the naming of children.243
Indeed, the biological aspect of parenthood raises the question
of whether family status could be relied on to strengthen claims
to access or custody by sperm donors.244
The legal and social history of adoption does suggest
that non-biological parenthood identifies a family form that has
disadvantaged family members and subjected them historically
to stereotyping and prejudice. At common law, adoption was
not a recognized form of parentage. As Elizabeth Bartholet
suggests, adoptive families have traditionally been perceived in
western cultures as unnatural and inevitably troubled,245 and
stereotypical attitudes about the presumed characteristics of
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individual adoptive families persist even as adoption is more
common. These attitudes affect both parents and children
although courts appear to accept more readily the historically
disadvantaged status of adopted children rather than adoptive
parents.246 As Gruben and Gilbert note, there are differences
between adopted children and children created through assisted
conception: in the latter case, at least one of the parents is often
a genetic parent and the birth is arranged in advance. 247
However, both signify a departure in some measure from
conventional biological parentage and in both cases, most
children would have been, but for its abolition, subject to the
taint of illegitimacy. The assumption that biology is an
exclusive or necessary condition of parentage also gives rise in
the context of assisted conception to a culture of secrecy and
shame that can expose children to psychological harm.
Beyond the issue of analogous grounds, there are also
questions as to whether the laws in question “create”
distinctions and if so, whether these distinctions perpetuate
disadvantage. The laws related to illegitimacy, which were
challenged under the Charter, expressly distinguished between
children of married or unmarried parents. Most were also
clearly detrimental to the status and rights of children of
unmarried parents by imposing restrictive conditions on the
ability of mothers to obtain support from putative fathers that
were not applied to children of married parents 248 or by
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preventing children from inheriting on intestacy.249 In all these
cases, children were not similarly treated and the resolution of
inequality entailed similar or identical treatment. Justifications
under section 1, such as the orderly distribution of property in
the case of intestacy statutes or evidentiary burdens, were
typically dismissed without substantial discussion.250
In the context of assisted reproduction, by contrast, the
laws at issue include both explicit and implicit exclusions that
fail to take account of material differences between sexual and
assisted conception. First, there is the exclusion of social
intending parents from the status of parents. If parentage
legislation is interpreted as identifying only biological parents
as legal parents, as may well be the case in Saskatchewan and
Manitoba, the law has thereby created a distinction that denies
intending social parents the legal status of parentage. The
failure to extend protection of the law to a particular group can
be challenged under section 15; whether the legislation
excludes explicitly or by way of omission is immaterial so long
as the exclusion is shown to have a disproportionate impact on
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a protected group. 251 In this context, recognition of secure
parentage is a benefit provided by law to children of
heterosexual biological parents, but not to children conceived
through the use of assisted conception.
Assuming the basis for the discrimination (whether
directly or indirectly on the grounds of family or marital status,
sex, sexual orientation or manner of conception) is recognized
under section 15, social intending parents cannot acquire the
immutable, lifelong status of parenthood in relation to children
they have helped to conceive with the intention of being a
parent, short of adoption.252 While an adoption can be sought,
this requires a post-birth legal proceeding and generally, the
consent of biological parents. Unlike adoption, the intending
parents in assisted conception are involved from the outset in
the planning for the child. Commitments are made in advance
of child’s birth and relied on by all parties with the view to
generating a stable environment for the rearing and
development of the child. Arguably, this exclusion does
perpetuate disadvantage by imposing a differential burden on
families that do not conform to a heterosexual biological
norm.253
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Moreover, this differential burden is based upon and
can perpetuate both prejudice and stereotyping that fails to
correspond to a claimant’s actual characteristics or
circumstances. In Quebec v A, Abella J defined prejudice as
the “holding of pejorative attitudes based on strongly held
views about the appropriate capacities and limits of individuals
or groups of which they are a member.”254 Historically, the
families affected by the type of exclusion in question, namely
same sex couples, single parent families and heterosexual nonbiological families, were all subject to widely held beliefs that
they provided inferior or defective settings in which to raise
children. As Lebel J for the minority noted, even apparently
neutral rules may perpetuate prejudice by establishing a
“hierarchy of worth” and “[treating] certain individuals like
second-class citizens whose aspirations are not equally
deserving of consideration.” 255 Stereotyping, according to
Abella J, “like prejudice, [is] a disadvantaging attitude, but one
that attributes characteristics to members of a group regardless
of their actual capacities.” 256 While some empirical studies
suggest that child outcomes differ on average according to
family form, outcomes in individual cases, as discussed, clearly
depend upon a range of variables that include stability,
parenting ability or capacity, social or economic supports, and
an absence of parental conflict. 257 Casting all families that
deviate from the heterosexual, biological nuclear norm in a
pejorative light is, in other words, a classic illustration of
negative stereotyping that both abstracts from the “actual need,
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capacity or circumstances of the claimant” 258 and “has the
effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage … because of his
or her [group] membership.”259
Beyond the exclusion of intending parents, other
sources of controversy include the explicit limitation of
parenthood in some statutes to one mother and father. Allowing
for only one of each gender would directly exclude same sex
couples whose families will, by definition, involve not one but
two mothers or two fathers.260 The fact that presumptions apply
only to heterosexual males may also constitute discrimination
on grounds of sex, sexual orientation, and family status.
Wilkinson J in PC v SL cast doubt in obiter on the validity of
such a claim by a lesbian intending parent,261 but in DWH v
DJR, a similar provision in the former Alberta Act was found to
discriminate against male individuals who were not in a
heterosexual relationship with the birth mother by not granting
them a presumption of paternity.262
The Charter implications are decidedly more uncertain
when the claim entails the relinquishment of parenthood or the
recognition of an intending parent (genetic or otherwise) in lieu
of a gamete donor or gestational mother. Does the failure to
exclude a sperm donor from the status of a parent constitute a
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violation of section 15? This omission affects all individuals
using assisted conception, including heterosexual intending
parents, but it can disproportionately impact same sex couples
and single parents, as they do not benefit from the statutory
presumptions under parentage statutes.263 Assuming that this
omission creates a discriminatory distinction between
biological and non-biological parents (by virtue of family or
marital status, the manner of conception, sexual orientation,
and/or sex), a court would also have to grapple with whether it
perpetuates disadvantage. While the omission may increase
potential sources of financial support for a child, it may also,
more importantly, compromise familial security and introduce
instability and conflict into a child’s life. The omission also
again reflects a refusal to recognize a distinctive familial form
based on a stereotyping of all same sex or single parent
families as deficient.
The failure to address the status of gestational mothers
in some jurisdictions raises similar issues but also the question
of whether the potential exclusion of parentage status, as found
in WJQM v AMA, discriminates against gestational mothers (on
the grounds of sex and manner of conception) by failing to
recognize differences in reproduction between men and
women. According to Andrews v Law Society of BC, “identical
treatment may frequently produce serious inequality.”264 Parity
between genetic mothers and fathers should thus not be the
deciding factor in disputes between genetic and gestational
mothers.
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Constitutional claims of a section 15 violation in the
context of assisted conception are clearly much more complex
than the challenges that were advanced in relation to
illegitimacy, even though discrimination in both contexts, as I
have argued, reinforces the same kind of prejudice. The net
effect of virtually all of the Charter challenges to illegitimacy
was to recognize children of unmarried parents as legitimate
and to extend parentage to and expand the private support
obligations of unmarried biological fathers. 265 By contrast, the
claims being advanced in the context of assisted conception
would extend parentage beyond the two-parent heterosexual
biological norm and vary the number of parents to more or less
than two in some cases. While such claims may be
controversial, at the same time, the claims fit well with the
individualistic premises of the Charter in that they call
attention to the fact that the well-being of children varies
according to the individual circumstances of their households.
Legal recognition of parentage in the context of assisted
conception would acknowledge that family members should
not be stigmatized and arbitrarily excluded at law based on
stereotypical assumptions related to family structure. The fact
that assisted conception arises from individual plans and
agreements may also resonate as exercises in individual choice
and autonomy, values that have been considered and embraced
by some judges of the Supreme Court under both sections 15
and 1.266
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CONCLUSION
Whether legislatures will be sufficiently moved by the prospect
of a Charter claim to provide equality of familial status where
children are conceived through assisted conception is an open
question. A number of other factors influential in the abolition
of illegitimacy are not as pressing or salient in the context of
such a potential reform. Whereas increasing numbers of
children were born outside of marriage into common law
unions from the 1970s onward, the number of children born
using assisted conception is not dramatically surging. While
many of the children were being reared by parents in
households functionally similar to heterosexual marital homes,
thereby legitimizing their status, assisted conception potentially
affects a diverse range of family forms, involving not only
heterosexual marital unions but social and multiple parentage,
same sex relationships, and single parenthood. Equalizing the
status of children of unmarried parents also ultimately placed
more emphasis on the obligations and rights of biological
fathers, which was consistent with the neoliberal privatization
agenda of the 1980s and 90s and the increasing emphasis on
both genetic ties and fatherhood in relation to child welfare
upon separation or divorce. By contrast, women in lesbian
relationships and single mothers directly challenge a child’s
need for fathers or genetic parents and to some degree, the
privatization agenda. Thus, the question of what serves the
well-being of children generally is still contested in the context
of assisted conception. Finally, while illegitimacy presented a
clear violation of formal equality, the resolution of claims
arising from assisted conception is complex, and legislative
efforts have varied across jurisdictions. Even in the face of the
multiple pressures that favoured the abolition of illegitimacy,
there was a significant delay in legislative reforms in
jurisdictions like Saskatchewan, with one jurisdiction, Nova
Scotia, still retaining the concept of legitimacy.
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Notwithstanding these differences, governments have
an obligation to provide certainty and stability for all children
and parents, even those children born by way of
unconventional arrangements. The present state of the law on
assisted conception within and across jurisdictions, however,
gives rise to numerous inconsistencies, inequalities and ad hoc
outcomes. Just as resistance to abolishing illegitimacy reflected
a reluctance to encourage non-marital sex and single
parenthood and a failure to recognize equality of familial
status, legislative gaps in assisted conception may also reflect a
reluctance to accept single parenthood or same sex families,
even at the cost of destabilizing heterosexual families
established through assisted conception. Any attempt, however,
to distinguish single parents or same sex parents from twoparent heterosexual families should raise Charter concerns. As
with the old story of illegitimacy, ensuring the security and
well being of all children is ultimately linked to a need to
accept both more diverse familial forms and a greater measure
of social responsibility for children.

